跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.07216 · v1

Compositional Unalignment: Auditing Safety in Large Vision-Language Models

首次提交 2026-11-05 07:09
版本更新 2026-11-05 07:09
雷达观测 2026-11-06 10:04
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to compositional harm: an image and a prompt that are benign in isolation become harmful through the model's cross-modal reasoning. Recent alignment methods report strong scores on compositional safety benchmarks, but an LLM judge only measures observed behavior and cannot reveal how robustly safety is integrated into the model. We argue that un-alignment provides a complementary audit of alignment robustness. We first show that minimal supervised fine-tuning reaches an LLM-judge score comparable to a multi-stage reinforcement-learning pipeline, so similar benchmark scores cannot establish robustness by themselves. We then show that recognition and refusal of compositional harm are decoupled: nine standard direction-finding methods detect compositional harm with up to AUC=0.99, yet ablating the recovered directions either leaves refusal intact or destroys model coherence. We therefore propose CMaG, a training-free un-alignment method for compositional safety. CMaG measures refusal intention with a refusal-versus-compliance log-probability margin, takes its gradient with respect to mid-layer activations, and contrasts it against partially benign pairs to isolate the cross-modal interaction term. A single backward pass over 80 examples yields a direction along which steering monotonically converts refusal into compliance. On Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVA-1.5-7B, CMaG reduces compositional safety scores by up to 65 points while over 98% of outputs remain coherent, outperforming gradient-based baselines; the direction also transfers to text-explicit harm and un-aligns models hardened by defensive training. Compositional safety can thus appear behaviorally strong while remaining fragile to targeted internal intervention. Warning: this paper contains unsafe model outputs, including references to self-harm.

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-05 07:09 · 最新观测版本

Compositional Unalignment: Auditing Safety in Large Vision-Language Models

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to compositional harm: an image and a prompt that are benign in isolation become harmful through the model's cross-modal reasoning. Recent alignment methods report strong scores on compositional safety benchmarks, but an LLM judge only measures observed behavior and cannot reveal how robustly safety is integrated into the model. We argue that un-alignment provides a complementary audit of alignment robustness. We first show that minimal supervised fine-tuning reaches an LLM-judge score comparable to a multi-stage reinforcement-learning pipeline, so similar benchmark scores cannot establish robustness by themselves. We then show that recognition and refusal of compositional harm are decoupled: nine standard direction-finding methods detect compositional harm with up to AUC=0.99, yet ablating the recovered directions either leaves refusal intact or destroys model coherence. We therefore propose CMaG, a training-free un-alignment method for compositional safety. CMaG measures refusal intention with a refusal-versus-compliance log-probability margin, takes its gradient with respect to mid-layer activations, and contrasts it against partially benign pairs to isolate the cross-modal interaction term. A single backward pass over 80 examples yields a direction along which steering monotonically converts refusal into compliance. On Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVA-1.5-7B, CMaG reduces compositional safety scores by up to 65 points while over 98% of outputs remain coherent, outperforming gradient-based baselines; the direction also transfers to text-explicit harm and un-aligns models hardened by defensive training. Compositional safety can thus appear behaviorally strong while remaining fragile to targeted internal intervention. Warning: this paper contains unsafe model outputs, including references to self-harm.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗