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arXiv:2611.08281 · v1

Multimodal-SEA: Benchmarking AI Agent Security under Multimodal Social Engineering Attacks

首次提交 2026-11-06 00:46
版本更新 2026-11-06 00:46
雷达观测 2026-11-06 12:09
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摘要

Personal AI agents face social engineering attacks supported by forged multimodal content, but existing evaluations mainly focus on text-based dialogue, leaving their intrinsic security under such attacks insufficiently studied. We introduce Multimodal-SEA, an interactive benchmark comprising 608 expert-designed tasks grounded in real-world fraud cases, covering 14 domains and 152 attack scenarios with prepared multimodal content. The tasks span four difficulty levels and reflect the distinct social and cultural contexts of Chinese and English environments. Agents inspect content, verify requests, and execute actions in simulated applications, with attack outcomes grounded in verifiable tool execution logs. To enable controlled red teaming of personal agents, we design a multimodal attack harness that integrates task information, attack progression control, and multimodal content construction to evaluate their intrinsic security against adaptive social engineering attacks in simulated environments. Evaluating seven widely used multimodal models across six dimensions reveals that all are vulnerable, with attack success rates of 7.1% to 34.5%. Adding multimodal content increases attack success from 19.9% to 29.2%, despite increased proactive verification coverage. Stronger safety instructions reduce attack success without improving recognition of deceptive multimodal content, while lower attack success rates for some models accompany excessive refusal of legitimate requests.

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v1 · 2026-11-06 00:46 · 最新观测版本

Multimodal-SEA: Benchmarking AI Agent Security under Multimodal Social Engineering Attacks

Personal AI agents face social engineering attacks supported by forged multimodal content, but existing evaluations mainly focus on text-based dialogue, leaving their intrinsic security under such attacks insufficiently studied. We introduce Multimodal-SEA, an interactive benchmark comprising 608 expert-designed tasks grounded in real-world fraud cases, covering 14 domains and 152 attack scenarios with prepared multimodal content. The tasks span four difficulty levels and reflect the distinct social and cultural contexts of Chinese and English environments. Agents inspect content, verify requests, and execute actions in simulated applications, with attack outcomes grounded in verifiable tool execution logs. To enable controlled red teaming of personal agents, we design a multimodal attack harness that integrates task information, attack progression control, and multimodal content construction to evaluate their intrinsic security against adaptive social engineering attacks in simulated environments. Evaluating seven widely used multimodal models across six dimensions reveals that all are vulnerable, with attack success rates of 7.1% to 34.5%. Adding multimodal content increases attack success from 19.9% to 29.2%, despite increased proactive verification coverage. Stronger safety instructions reduce attack success without improving recognition of deceptive multimodal content, while lower attack success rates for some models accompany excessive refusal of legitimate requests.

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