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arXiv:2611.09771 · v1

A Cross-Domain TARA-to-NAC Rule Mapping Methodology: From Automotive OEM Networks to Energy Storage Systems

跨域 TARA 到 NAC 规则映射方法:从汽车 OEM 网络到储能系统

首次提交 2026-11-07 01:33
版本更新 2026-11-07 01:33
雷达观测 2026-11-09 13:22
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Threat analysis and risk assessment under ISO/SAE 21434 ends with cybersecurity goals, but existing methods give little structured guidance for turning those goals into enforceable network access control rules. Compliance standards such as IEC 62443, ISO/SAE 21434, and ISO/IEC 27001 are usually applied as parallel efforts rather than as one enforcement architecture. This paper presents a six-step methodology that maps cybersecurity goals from a threat analysis and risk assessment to network access control rules, each placed at a named enforcement point and traceable to the threat records behind it. It also presents a unified compliance framework that treats IEC 62443 and ISO/IEC 27001 as a fixed substrate and domain-specific regulation as an interchangeable overlay. The methodology is applied to an automotive original equipment manufacturer plant network, addressing multi-tier supplier authorization and legacy operational technology devices, and then to utility-scale battery energy storage, where North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards and ISO/IEC 27019 replace the automotive-specific standard while the substrate stays constant. In the automotive example, 37 threat entries and 24 cybersecurity goals yield 23 rules covering 11 of the 13 in-scope goals; the energy example yields six rules. Three derived rules have no equivalent in the cited standards. Both examples are desk-based: the methodology is applied to them, not tested on them. The result is a reusable pattern for translating risk assessment into enforcement across critical infrastructure sectors, with empirical validation left as future work.

作者备注:Preprint, 23 pages, SAE format

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基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

提出一套六步方法,把 ISO/SAE 21434 威胁分析与风险评估得出的网络安全目标映射为可追溯、落在指定执行点的网络访问控制规则,并在汽车 OEM 工厂网络与公用事业级电池储能两个场景做桌面推演。

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v1 · 2026-11-07 01:33 · 最新观测版本

A Cross-Domain TARA-to-NAC Rule Mapping Methodology: From Automotive OEM Networks to Energy Storage Systems

Threat analysis and risk assessment under ISO/SAE 21434 ends with cybersecurity goals, but existing methods give little structured guidance for turning those goals into enforceable network access control rules. Compliance standards such as IEC 62443, ISO/SAE 21434, and ISO/IEC 27001 are usually applied as parallel efforts rather than as one enforcement architecture. This paper presents a six-step methodology that maps cybersecurity goals from a threat analysis and risk assessment to network access control rules, each placed at a named enforcement point and traceable to the threat records behind it. It also presents a unified compliance framework that treats IEC 62443 and ISO/IEC 27001 as a fixed substrate and domain-specific regulation as an interchangeable overlay. The methodology is applied to an automotive original equipment manufacturer plant network, addressing multi-tier supplier authorization and legacy operational technology devices, and then to utility-scale battery energy storage, where North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards and ISO/IEC 27019 replace the automotive-specific standard while the substrate stays constant. In the automotive example, 37 threat entries and 24 cybersecurity goals yield 23 rules covering 11 of the 13 in-scope goals; the energy example yields six rules. Three derived rules have no equivalent in the cited standards. Both examples are desk-based: the methodology is applied to them, not tested on them. The result is a reusable pattern for translating risk assessment into enforcement across critical infrastructure sectors, with empirical validation left as future work.

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