← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.12648 · v1
Maurer-Inspired Two-Way Physical-Layer Authentication Against Multi-Antenna Impersonation Attacks
首次提交 2026-11-10 00:20
版本更新 2026-11-10 00:20
雷达观测 2026-11-10 15:22
摘要
In this work, we investigate Maurer-inspired two-way physical-layer authentication. Alice seeks authentication by Bob in the presence of a multi-antenna impersonator, Trudy. Trudy may replace the challenge to Alice, the response to Bob, or both. To create an information advantage, Bob adds artificial noise (AN) to his challenge, and Alice adds spatial AN while forwarding the received mixture. Bob predicts the response from trusted preparation, whereas Trudy observes only a noisy version of the challenge, and Alice's AN interferes with Trudy's preparation reception. Impersonation thus requires matching Bob's fresh randomness beyond the channel consistency checked by public-pilot one-way authentication. For quasi-static Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output channels with time-division duplex (TDD) reciprocity, we derive missed-detection bounds for attacks that replace the authentication challenge, the response, or both. These bounds assume attack-free initial training and preparation and account for estimation error and AN leakage. With equal antenna numbers at all nodes, we show scenarios where the proposed scheme has lower worst-case missed detection than specified one-way tests with/without AN.
作者备注：18 pages, 1 figure. Submitted to IEEE ICC 2027
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v1 · 2026-11-10 00:20 · 最新观测版本
Maurer-Inspired Two-Way Physical-Layer Authentication Against Multi-Antenna Impersonation Attacks
In this work, we investigate Maurer-inspired two-way physical-layer authentication. Alice seeks authentication by Bob in the presence of a multi-antenna impersonator, Trudy. Trudy may replace the challenge to Alice, the response to Bob, or both. To create an information advantage, Bob adds artificial noise (AN) to his challenge, and Alice adds spatial AN while forwarding the received mixture. Bob predicts the response from trusted preparation, whereas Trudy observes only a noisy version of the challenge, and Alice's AN interferes with Trudy's preparation reception. Impersonation thus requires matching Bob's fresh randomness beyond the channel consistency checked by public-pilot one-way authentication. For quasi-static Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output channels with time-division duplex (TDD) reciprocity, we derive missed-detection bounds for attacks that replace the authentication challenge, the response, or both. These bounds assume attack-free initial training and preparation and account for estimation error and AN leakage. With equal antenna numbers at all nodes, we show scenarios where the proposed scheme has lower worst-case missed detection than specified one-way tests with/without AN.
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