← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.13922 · v1
Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards
首次提交 2026-11-10 19:10
版本更新 2026-11-10 19:10
雷达观测 2026-11-11 11:04
摘要
Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) recover typed text from the sound of keystrokes, using only a commodity microphone and no access to the victim's device. Prior work establishes that such attacks succeed under idealized laboratory conditions - a single keyboard, a fixed microphone, a quiet room, and training and testing on the same device but leaves open the question that matters for security: whether keystroke inference survives the open world of unseen keyboards, diverse users, noisy environments, and compressed transmission channels. The answer developed here is that it does, provided the acoustic model is made explicitly domain-invariant and its noisy predictions are corrected by a language model.
观测到的版本
相邻记录可能跳过中间版本；首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。
v1 · 2026-11-10 19:10 · 最新观测版本
Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards
Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) recover typed text from the sound of keystrokes, using only a commodity microphone and no access to the victim's device. Prior work establishes that such attacks succeed under idealized laboratory conditions - a single keyboard, a fixed microphone, a quiet room, and training and testing on the same device but leaves open the question that matters for security: whether keystroke inference survives the open world of unseen keyboards, diverse users, noisy environments, and compressed transmission channels. The answer developed here is that it does, provided the acoustic model is made explicitly domain-invariant and its noisy predictions are corrected by a language model.
查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗