← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.17176 · v1
Validation-Guided Prompt Selection for Differential Morphing Attack Detection
验证引导的提示选择用于差分变形攻击检测
首次提交 2026-11-13 01:46
版本更新 2026-11-13 01:46
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
摘要
Differential morphing attack detection (D-MAD) compares a trusted live capture with a document image that may contain a facial morph. We investigate whether labelled validation data can improve a frozen-parameter vision-language evaluator through prompt selection rather than model fine-tuning. Version~1 generates 50 candidate prompts and selects the top-ranked instruction using a security-oriented loss that prioritises missed morph attacks (MACER) while accounting for bona fide classification errors (BSCER), response failures, parse failures, and decision inconsistency. Version~2 recursively revises prompts using aggregate validation feedback. On a subject-disjoint test set of 160 pairs spanning LMA, MIPGAN-2, and PIPE, the selected Version~1 prompt achieves a (19.17\%) morph attack classification error rate (MACER), with (0.00\%) observed bona fide sample classification error rate (BSCER), compared with (70.00\%) MACER for a controlled manual prompt. The paired (50.83) percentage-point difference has a (95\%) subject-bootstrap interval of ([43.33,58.33]). Recursive revision does not surpass the best Generation~0 validation loss; the reported revised descendant obtains (31.67\%) test MACER. All 23 attacks missed by Version~1 are landmark-based (LMA) morphs. Overall, the results show that prompt formulation can substantially influence frozen-parameter VLM-based D-MAD performance, while also highlighting the challenge of recursive prompt refinement under a compact 10-subject validation setting.
作者备注：Accepted in WACV 2027 Workshops
观测到的版本
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v1 · 2026-11-13 01:46 · 最新观测版本
Validation-Guided Prompt Selection for Differential Morphing Attack Detection
Differential morphing attack detection (D-MAD) compares a trusted live capture with a document image that may contain a facial morph. We investigate whether labelled validation data can improve a frozen-parameter vision-language evaluator through prompt selection rather than model fine-tuning. Version~1 generates 50 candidate prompts and selects the top-ranked instruction using a security-oriented loss that prioritises missed morph attacks (MACER) while accounting for bona fide classification errors (BSCER), response failures, parse failures, and decision inconsistency. Version~2 recursively revises prompts using aggregate validation feedback. On a subject-disjoint test set of 160 pairs spanning LMA, MIPGAN-2, and PIPE, the selected Version~1 prompt achieves a (19.17\%) morph attack classification error rate (MACER), with (0.00\%) observed bona fide sample classification error rate (BSCER), compared with (70.00\%) MACER for a controlled manual prompt. The paired (50.83) percentage-point difference has a (95\%) subject-bootstrap interval of ([43.33,58.33]). Recursive revision does not surpass the best Generation~0 validation loss; the reported revised descendant obtains (31.67\%) test MACER. All 23 attacks missed by Version~1 are landmark-based (LMA) morphs. Overall, the results show that prompt formulation can substantially influence frozen-parameter VLM-based D-MAD performance, while also highlighting the challenge of recursive prompt refinement under a compact 10-subject validation setting.
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