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arXiv:2611.19551 · v1

TrustBound: Mechanized Completeness for Payment Epochs Initiated by AI Agents

首次提交 2026-11-15 02:31
版本更新 2026-11-15 02:31
雷达观测 2026-11-17 12:06
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摘要

Payment operations requested by an AI agent may remain executable, or their outcomes unresolved, after the agent has stopped. We study when a trusted payment service can account for every payment in an epoch and exclude further payments under earlier authority. We give a Lean model in which operations are recorded before they receive execution authority and both actions are serialized with an admission fence. We prove that fencing fixes a journal that covers every modeled effect and outstanding right; that discharging those rights prevents further effects; and that truthful outcomes for the recorded identities then give exact accounting. A provider-contract model, mapped to the admission model, makes created payment objects inert until registered. Premise-removal mutations confirm that each key premise is needed. We connect the models to an executable service: six service histories are checked against the model in Lean, and bounded schedules, scripted clients and concurrent workers exercise its reconciliation. The concurrent experiments uncovered a conflict caused by reordered provider reads, which serializing retrieval with journal updates removes in all tested cases. The result separates two obligations that are easily conflated in practice - preventing future payments and accounting for past ones - and states precisely which service guarantees establish each.

作者备注:16 pages (LNCS), 2 figures, 8 tables. Code and Lean models: https://github.com/tokencraftdata/trustbound

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v1 · 2026-11-15 02:31 · 最新观测版本

TrustBound: Mechanized Completeness for Payment Epochs Initiated by AI Agents

Payment operations requested by an AI agent may remain executable, or their outcomes unresolved, after the agent has stopped. We study when a trusted payment service can account for every payment in an epoch and exclude further payments under earlier authority. We give a Lean model in which operations are recorded before they receive execution authority and both actions are serialized with an admission fence. We prove that fencing fixes a journal that covers every modeled effect and outstanding right; that discharging those rights prevents further effects; and that truthful outcomes for the recorded identities then give exact accounting. A provider-contract model, mapped to the admission model, makes created payment objects inert until registered. Premise-removal mutations confirm that each key premise is needed. We connect the models to an executable service: six service histories are checked against the model in Lean, and bounded schedules, scripted clients and concurrent workers exercise its reconciliation. The concurrent experiments uncovered a conflict caused by reordered provider reads, which serializing retrieval with journal updates removes in all tested cases. The result separates two obligations that are easily conflated in practice - preventing future payments and accounting for past ones - and states precisely which service guarantees establish each.

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