← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.20528 · v1
ReconPotBench: Evaluating LLM Honeypots in Multi-Round Linux Reconnaissance
首次提交 2026-11-16 13:04
版本更新 2026-11-16 13:04
雷达观测 2026-11-17 13:07
摘要
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to build interactive honeypots, yet existing evaluations mainly assess isolated command outputs and cannot determine whether a system remains believable when later commands depend on earlier results. We present ReconPotBench, a multi-round benchmark for Linux reconnaissance honeypots. It contains 1{,}032 three-round reconnaissance interactions across eight reconnaissance categories, with reference outputs collected from a real Linux environment. Under a unified testing protocol, we compare Cowrie, open-source LLMs, and closed-source LLMs along three dimensions: round-level authenticity, cross-round contextual consistency, and hacker-oriented reconnaissance value. Results show that multi-round evaluation exposes failures hidden by single-round testing, as authenticity declines with interaction depth and both open-source and closed-source LLMs struggle to maintain coherent state across rounds. LLM-based honeypots nevertheless outperform Cowrie in authenticity and reconnaissance value, while Cowrie remains more consistent because of its rigid templated behavior. Category-level analysis further shows that tasks requiring systems to preserve network relationships across rounds are harder than tasks centered on explicit entities such as ports. ReconPotBench enables reproducible evaluation of LLM honeypots across authenticity, entity consistency, and hacker-perspective utility in dependent multi-round interactions. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/qianli-wang/ReconPotBench
作者备注:EACL 2027 Finding
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v1 · 2026-11-16 13:04 · 最新观测版本
ReconPotBench: Evaluating LLM Honeypots in Multi-Round Linux Reconnaissance
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to build interactive honeypots, yet existing evaluations mainly assess isolated command outputs and cannot determine whether a system remains believable when later commands depend on earlier results. We present ReconPotBench, a multi-round benchmark for Linux reconnaissance honeypots. It contains 1{,}032 three-round reconnaissance interactions across eight reconnaissance categories, with reference outputs collected from a real Linux environment. Under a unified testing protocol, we compare Cowrie, open-source LLMs, and closed-source LLMs along three dimensions: round-level authenticity, cross-round contextual consistency, and hacker-oriented reconnaissance value. Results show that multi-round evaluation exposes failures hidden by single-round testing, as authenticity declines with interaction depth and both open-source and closed-source LLMs struggle to maintain coherent state across rounds. LLM-based honeypots nevertheless outperform Cowrie in authenticity and reconnaissance value, while Cowrie remains more consistent because of its rigid templated behavior. Category-level analysis further shows that tasks requiring systems to preserve network relationships across rounds are harder than tasks centered on explicit entities such as ports. ReconPotBench enables reproducible evaluation of LLM honeypots across authenticity, entity consistency, and hacker-perspective utility in dependent multi-round interactions. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/qianli-wang/ReconPotBench
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