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arXiv:2611.21528 · v1

Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd

首次提交 2026-11-17 02:18
版本更新 2026-11-17 02:18
雷达观测 2026-11-17 16:10
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

The key agreements that protect a Wi-Fi connection rely on Diffie-Hellman, which a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break; an adversary can therefore record an association today and decrypt its traffic years later. Key establishment is thus the part of IEEE 802.11 that has to be migrated first. This work targets the two protocols that perform that agreement inside the frames used to set up the link: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE), which encrypts otherwise open networks, and Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS), designed for fast connection in dense and mobile deployments. We propose replacing their Diffie-Hellman exchange with a hybrid one that runs the classical elliptic-curve agreement alongside ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and derives the master key from both secrets, so the connection stays protected as long as either component remains unbroken. The exchange reuses the frames each protocol already sends and adds no extra round trip; an access point can advertise the hybrid mode alongside classical OWE, and a station configured to require it refuses to associate without a completed post-quantum exchange. Binding the advertised capabilities to the derived key is specified as a design extension and is not part of the prototype. We validate the design with a working implementation on hostapd and wpa_supplicant: both endpoints derive the same key in every measured connection, with the two smaller parameter sets each enlarged association frame fits in a single frame even under a conservative 1500-byte fragmentation threshold, and the added connection time and computation stay below half a millisecond. The measurements are obtained on OWE; the design carries over to FILS, whose frame budget is left for specific measurement. Of the three ML-KEM parameter sets, the intermediate one offers the best balance between security level and size.

作者备注:8 pages, 4 figures, 4 tables

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v1 · 2026-11-17 02:18 · 最新观测版本

Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd

The key agreements that protect a Wi-Fi connection rely on Diffie-Hellman, which a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break; an adversary can therefore record an association today and decrypt its traffic years later. Key establishment is thus the part of IEEE 802.11 that has to be migrated first. This work targets the two protocols that perform that agreement inside the frames used to set up the link: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE), which encrypts otherwise open networks, and Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS), designed for fast connection in dense and mobile deployments. We propose replacing their Diffie-Hellman exchange with a hybrid one that runs the classical elliptic-curve agreement alongside ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and derives the master key from both secrets, so the connection stays protected as long as either component remains unbroken. The exchange reuses the frames each protocol already sends and adds no extra round trip; an access point can advertise the hybrid mode alongside classical OWE, and a station configured to require it refuses to associate without a completed post-quantum exchange. Binding the advertised capabilities to the derived key is specified as a design extension and is not part of the prototype. We validate the design with a working implementation on hostapd and wpa_supplicant: both endpoints derive the same key in every measured connection, with the two smaller parameter sets each enlarged association frame fits in a single frame even under a conservative 1500-byte fragmentation threshold, and the added connection time and computation stay below half a millisecond. The measurements are obtained on OWE; the design carries over to FILS, whose frame budget is left for specific measurement. Of the three ML-KEM parameter sets, the intermediate one offers the best balance between security level and size.

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