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arXiv:2611.22223 · v1

GapLeak: When Privacy-Preserving LLM-based Web Agents Become a Privacy Risk

首次提交 2026-11-17 13:06
版本更新 2026-11-17 13:06
雷达观测 2026-11-18 19:43
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摘要

Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents rely on data minimization and least privilege to protect user privacy. We show that these principles are necessary but insufficient: they constrain authorized sources, but not higher-sensitivity sources that remain reachable. A website can request a field unavailable from authorized sources, creating an information gap. To complete the task, a goal-driven agent may escalate to reachable but unauthorized sources and disclose accumulated sensitive information. We formalize this vulnerability as GapLeak, where an adversary exploits a legitimate web form without prompt injection or other malicious instructions. We evaluate GapLeak on three web-agent frameworks and six LLMs from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI across recruitment, e-commerce, travel, and healthcare. GapLeak induces an average unauthorized disclosure of approximately 37%. The information gap is the primary driver: eliminating it reduces disclosure by more than 50%. Existing instruction-level defenses based on least privilege partially mitigate the vulnerability but often reduce task success. We propose submission-time verification, which filters unauthorized content before form submission, eliminating over 96% of unauthorized disclosures while preserving task success.

作者备注:Accepted for publication in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2027, Issue 2 Abstract shortened for arXiv character limit

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v1 · 2026-11-17 13:06 · 最新观测版本

GapLeak: When Privacy-Preserving LLM-based Web Agents Become a Privacy Risk

Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents rely on data minimization and least privilege to protect user privacy. We show that these principles are necessary but insufficient: they constrain authorized sources, but not higher-sensitivity sources that remain reachable. A website can request a field unavailable from authorized sources, creating an information gap. To complete the task, a goal-driven agent may escalate to reachable but unauthorized sources and disclose accumulated sensitive information. We formalize this vulnerability as GapLeak, where an adversary exploits a legitimate web form without prompt injection or other malicious instructions. We evaluate GapLeak on three web-agent frameworks and six LLMs from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI across recruitment, e-commerce, travel, and healthcare. GapLeak induces an average unauthorized disclosure of approximately 37%. The information gap is the primary driver: eliminating it reduces disclosure by more than 50%. Existing instruction-level defenses based on least privilege partially mitigate the vulnerability but often reduce task success. We propose submission-time verification, which filters unauthorized content before form submission, eliminating over 96% of unauthorized disclosures while preserving task success.

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