← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.22479 · v1
Exploited Before It Was Fixed? Vulnerability Timelines from Open, Machine-Readable Evidence
首次提交 2026-11-17 17:37
版本更新 2026-11-17 17:37
雷达观测 2026-11-18 11:33
摘要
-05-X-03), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogs, and exploitation sightings. We introduce an evidence model implemented in Vulnerability-Lookup that selects the earliest evidence for each lifecycle event, distinguishes vulnerability-specific records, preserves date precision, and ensures traceability to original sources. Among 3,758 vulnerability identifiers with exploitation evidence, 98% have disclosure dates, while only 15.7% have patch evidence. Vendor-side dates required by VTEM are entirely absent. Most exploitation dates originate from catalog listings, including 1,041 entries associated with bulk catalog imports. After excluding these entries and ambiguous same-day observations, 59 vulnerabilities exhibit patch evidence following exploitation evidence, with a median interval of 7.6 days, predominantly between catalog listings and distributor fixes. Evidence traceability also exposes systematic measurement errors: one collector incorrectly classified exploit publications as active exploitation, accounting for 40% of initial exploitation dates, while another catalog assigned vulnerability publication timestamps to 11% of its listings. Our findings demonstrate that exploitation-to-patch intervals are computationally measurable, but their reliability depends on the availability, precision, and provenance of published evidence. We identify the additional disclosure, exploitation observation, and patch availability timestamps needed to improve vulnerability lifecycle measurements.
作者备注:8 pages
观测到的版本
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v1 · 2026-11-17 17:37 · 最新观测版本
Exploited Before It Was Fixed? Vulnerability Timelines from Open, Machine-Readable Evidence
-05-X-03), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogs, and exploitation sightings. We introduce an evidence model implemented in Vulnerability-Lookup that selects the earliest evidence for each lifecycle event, distinguishes vulnerability-specific records, preserves date precision, and ensures traceability to original sources. Among 3,758 vulnerability identifiers with exploitation evidence, 98% have disclosure dates, while only 15.7% have patch evidence. Vendor-side dates required by VTEM are entirely absent. Most exploitation dates originate from catalog listings, including 1,041 entries associated with bulk catalog imports. After excluding these entries and ambiguous same-day observations, 59 vulnerabilities exhibit patch evidence following exploitation evidence, with a median interval of 7.6 days, predominantly between catalog listings and distributor fixes. Evidence traceability also exposes systematic measurement errors: one collector incorrectly classified exploit publications as active exploitation, accounting for 40% of initial exploitation dates, while another catalog assigned vulnerability publication timestamps to 11% of its listings. Our findings demonstrate that exploitation-to-patch intervals are computationally measurable, but their reliability depends on the availability, precision, and provenance of published evidence. We identify the additional disclosure, exploitation observation, and patch availability timestamps needed to improve vulnerability lifecycle measurements.
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