← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.23201 · v1
Governance Risks in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): Implications for Traditional Financial Institutions
去中心化自治组织(DAO)的治理风险:对传统金融机构的启示
首次提交 2026-11-18 02:42
版本更新 2026-11-18 02:42
雷达观测 2026-11-18 12:34
摘要
As financial institutions increasingly interact with blockchain ecosystems through decentralized finance, stablecoins, tokenized assets, and distributed ledger infrastructure, they come to depend on systems governed wholly or partly by decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). This paper examines how DAO governance differs from traditional corporate governance and what this implies for risk management in regulated financial institutions. Using a qualitative comparative framework grounded in OECD governance principles, Basel Committee guidance, and FINMA circulars, the study maps DAO deliberation, voting, and accountability mechanisms against established governance and risk-management principles and illustrates associated risks through selected real-world cases. The analysis shows that DAOs preserve core governance functions but redistribute them across token holders, delegates, community forums, smart contracts, and legal wrapper entities. This creates distinct risks, including voting-power concentration, weak proposal controls, legal uncertainty, and unclear accountability, which established frameworks do not fully capture, while also offering two transferable strengths: a transparent, traceable decision record and a direct link between approval and execution. The paper contributes a structured assessment framework linking DAO governance characteristics to existing governance, outsourcing, technology-risk, and operational-resilience processes, enabling institutions to address DAO-governed dependencies through targeted extensions of current practices rather than a separate risk framework.
作者备注:16 pages, 5 tables
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v1 · 2026-11-18 02:42 · 最新观测版本
Governance Risks in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs): Implications for Traditional Financial Institutions
As financial institutions increasingly interact with blockchain ecosystems through decentralized finance, stablecoins, tokenized assets, and distributed ledger infrastructure, they come to depend on systems governed wholly or partly by decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). This paper examines how DAO governance differs from traditional corporate governance and what this implies for risk management in regulated financial institutions. Using a qualitative comparative framework grounded in OECD governance principles, Basel Committee guidance, and FINMA circulars, the study maps DAO deliberation, voting, and accountability mechanisms against established governance and risk-management principles and illustrates associated risks through selected real-world cases. The analysis shows that DAOs preserve core governance functions but redistribute them across token holders, delegates, community forums, smart contracts, and legal wrapper entities. This creates distinct risks, including voting-power concentration, weak proposal controls, legal uncertainty, and unclear accountability, which established frameworks do not fully capture, while also offering two transferable strengths: a transparent, traceable decision record and a direct link between approval and execution. The paper contributes a structured assessment framework linking DAO governance characteristics to existing governance, outsourcing, technology-risk, and operational-resilience processes, enabling institutions to address DAO-governed dependencies through targeted extensions of current practices rather than a separate risk framework.
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