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arXiv:2611.23666 · v1

Rented Oscillations: Multi-Tenant Data Center Workload Synchronization Attacks and Mitigation

首次提交 2026-11-18 08:49
版本更新 2026-11-18 08:49
雷达观测 2026-11-19 19:08
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摘要

Multi-tenant data center (DC) facilities rent computing capacity on demand, placing controllable load within reach of anyone willing to pay for it. This paper considers a stealthy adversary who rents workstations and runs deliberately unoptimized large language model (LLM) training, synchronizing their consumption into large periodic oscillations while each workload remains individually indistinguishable from benign training. The periodicity of such workloads is characterized experimentally and used to model facility consumption, showing that oscillations emerge from the interaction of concurrent workloads, whether aligned by an adversary or arising naturally. A combined small- and large-signal assessment, under a hardware-grounded threat model whose feasibility is supported by experiments on a supercomputer, locates the oscillatory weak points of the network. MW-scale oscillations are shown to saturate the generators' control limiters, amplifying their effect, while Floquet analysis reveals a lightly damped mode emerging near the forcing frequency. To counter both origins, signal-energy-based detection and mitigation are proposed, the latter re-timing the workloads to minimize the facility's oscillatory energy. The approach is validated through power hardware-in-the-loop (PHIL) experiments and real-time simulations on a surrogate model of the Saudi Arabian transmission network.

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v1 · 2026-11-18 08:49 · 最新观测版本

Rented Oscillations: Multi-Tenant Data Center Workload Synchronization Attacks and Mitigation

Multi-tenant data center (DC) facilities rent computing capacity on demand, placing controllable load within reach of anyone willing to pay for it. This paper considers a stealthy adversary who rents workstations and runs deliberately unoptimized large language model (LLM) training, synchronizing their consumption into large periodic oscillations while each workload remains individually indistinguishable from benign training. The periodicity of such workloads is characterized experimentally and used to model facility consumption, showing that oscillations emerge from the interaction of concurrent workloads, whether aligned by an adversary or arising naturally. A combined small- and large-signal assessment, under a hardware-grounded threat model whose feasibility is supported by experiments on a supercomputer, locates the oscillatory weak points of the network. MW-scale oscillations are shown to saturate the generators' control limiters, amplifying their effect, while Floquet analysis reveals a lightly damped mode emerging near the forcing frequency. To counter both origins, signal-energy-based detection and mitigation are proposed, the latter re-timing the workloads to minimize the facility's oscillatory energy. The approach is validated through power hardware-in-the-loop (PHIL) experiments and real-time simulations on a surrogate model of the Saudi Arabian transmission network.

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