← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.25470 · v1
ToolPulse: Side-Channel Eavesdropping on Tool-Using LLM Agents
首次提交 2026-11-19 11:57
版本更新 2026-11-19 11:57
雷达观测 2026-11-20 10:50
摘要
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that translate user requests into sequences of local tool invocations. While prior cache-based side-channel attacks target the locally deployed models, they typically require the adversary to share model-related components or hardware resources with the victim's inference process. These assumptions do not apply to the predominant agentic settings, in which commercial LLMs execute on vendor-controlled infrastructure. We show that agentic execution exposes a more practical attack surface: although inference remains remote, tools are executed on the user's machine and commonly rely on shared system libraries. In this paper, we first systematically evaluate Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe for monitoring agentic tool invocations. Our evaluation across three hardware platforms shows that Flush+Reload enables accurate, real-time tool monitoring, whereas Prime+Probe, despite supporting cross-VM attacks, incurs prohibitive monitoring overhead and suffers from cache-set aliasing. We present ToolPulse, a cache-based side-channel eavesdropping framework against tool-using agents. We first design the Tool Recovery Attack to reconstruct an agent's tool-execution workflow. We evaluate the Tool Recovery Attack on 11 LLMs across Codex and Claude Code. It consistently reconstructs tool workflows, with the lowest F1 score exceeding 93%. We further demonstrate two attack scenarios enabled by the recovered traces. Task Profiling Attack infers user intent across two Terminal-Bench task categories and the Trigger Localization Attack identifies sensitive tool calls in encryption/decryption and model training/inference workloads. Even under substantial system noise on a server shared by approximately 20 users, both Task Profiling Attack and Trigger Localization Attack maintain high accuracy.
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v1 · 2026-11-19 11:57 · 最新观测版本
ToolPulse: Side-Channel Eavesdropping on Tool-Using LLM Agents
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that translate user requests into sequences of local tool invocations. While prior cache-based side-channel attacks target the locally deployed models, they typically require the adversary to share model-related components or hardware resources with the victim's inference process. These assumptions do not apply to the predominant agentic settings, in which commercial LLMs execute on vendor-controlled infrastructure. We show that agentic execution exposes a more practical attack surface: although inference remains remote, tools are executed on the user's machine and commonly rely on shared system libraries. In this paper, we first systematically evaluate Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe for monitoring agentic tool invocations. Our evaluation across three hardware platforms shows that Flush+Reload enables accurate, real-time tool monitoring, whereas Prime+Probe, despite supporting cross-VM attacks, incurs prohibitive monitoring overhead and suffers from cache-set aliasing. We present ToolPulse, a cache-based side-channel eavesdropping framework against tool-using agents. We first design the Tool Recovery Attack to reconstruct an agent's tool-execution workflow. We evaluate the Tool Recovery Attack on 11 LLMs across Codex and Claude Code. It consistently reconstructs tool workflows, with the lowest F1 score exceeding 93%. We further demonstrate two attack scenarios enabled by the recovered traces. Task Profiling Attack infers user intent across two Terminal-Bench task categories and the Trigger Localization Attack identifies sensitive tool calls in encryption/decryption and model training/inference workloads. Even under substantial system noise on a server shared by approximately 20 users, both Task Profiling Attack and Trigger Localization Attack maintain high accuracy.
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