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arXiv:2611.25945 · v1

BlockJack: Cross-Tenant Redirection Fault Attacks on Paged KV Cache Address Translation in LLM Serving

首次提交 2026-11-19 19:31
版本更新 2026-11-19 19:31
雷达观测 2026-11-20 16:53
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Large language model (LLM) serving frameworks accelerate inference by retaining previously computed states in a key-value (KV) cache. Paged serving frameworks such as vLLM organize this cache through block tables analogous to OS page tables, which map each request's logical KV blocks to physical KV blocks, forming a software-managed address translation layer. Although fault attacks such as Rowhammer have exploited OS page tables to redirect memory accesses, prior fault attacks on LLMs have largely targeted the data plane, i.e., model weights or KV-cache contents, leaving KV-cache mapping unexplored. We present BlockJack (i.e., Block Hijack), the first KV cache address-translation fault attack in LLM inference. By corrupting block-table entries, BlockJack redirects a request's KV cache reads to blocks assigned to another tenant's request without modifying model parameters, prompts, or cached KV states. It achieves both confidentiality violation (victim information appears in attacker responses) and integrity violation (attacker-supplied context steers victim answers). We study paged KV cache mappings in vLLM and formally characterize when redirect targets are predictable. Across seven models spanning the Qwen, Llama, Gemma, and Phi families, a faulted mapping exposes victim context. For the integrity attack, we examine how topic proximity, intra-topic divergence, and model behavior shape redirected responses. On a 248-scene medical benchmark, the integrity attack causes up to 41.1% of responses to recommend less urgent care, while still appearing consistent with the victim's question. We demonstrate physical feasibility of BlockJack with Rowhammer and subsequently evaluate assignment validation as a defense. Following responsible disclosure, vLLM and Sonar confirmed the vulnerability and proposed patches that we reviewed and validated.

作者备注:6 figures, 5 tables

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v1 · 2026-11-19 19:31 · 最新观测版本

BlockJack: Cross-Tenant Redirection Fault Attacks on Paged KV Cache Address Translation in LLM Serving

Large language model (LLM) serving frameworks accelerate inference by retaining previously computed states in a key-value (KV) cache. Paged serving frameworks such as vLLM organize this cache through block tables analogous to OS page tables, which map each request's logical KV blocks to physical KV blocks, forming a software-managed address translation layer. Although fault attacks such as Rowhammer have exploited OS page tables to redirect memory accesses, prior fault attacks on LLMs have largely targeted the data plane, i.e., model weights or KV-cache contents, leaving KV-cache mapping unexplored. We present BlockJack (i.e., Block Hijack), the first KV cache address-translation fault attack in LLM inference. By corrupting block-table entries, BlockJack redirects a request's KV cache reads to blocks assigned to another tenant's request without modifying model parameters, prompts, or cached KV states. It achieves both confidentiality violation (victim information appears in attacker responses) and integrity violation (attacker-supplied context steers victim answers). We study paged KV cache mappings in vLLM and formally characterize when redirect targets are predictable. Across seven models spanning the Qwen, Llama, Gemma, and Phi families, a faulted mapping exposes victim context. For the integrity attack, we examine how topic proximity, intra-topic divergence, and model behavior shape redirected responses. On a 248-scene medical benchmark, the integrity attack causes up to 41.1% of responses to recommend less urgent care, while still appearing consistent with the victim's question. We demonstrate physical feasibility of BlockJack with Rowhammer and subsequently evaluate assignment validation as a defense. Following responsible disclosure, vLLM and Sonar confirmed the vulnerability and proposed patches that we reviewed and validated.

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