← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.26100 · v1
Causal Overtaking in Fair Transaction Ordering
首次提交 2026-11-19 21:33
版本更新 2026-11-19 21:33
雷达观测 2026-11-20 16:53
摘要
Fair transaction ordering protocols aim to mitigate front-running using replica-local arrival orders, but prior work often assumes a single submission origin for each responsive transaction. We identify causal overtaking, in which corrupted replicas observe a target and submit identical signed copies of a responsive transaction through multiple client entries. The copies' first arrivals at different replicas can collectively provide ordering support that no individual path achieves, allowing the response to execute before its target. We formalize a class of receipt-order protocols, including Themis, characterize the timing and network conditions under which the attack is feasible, and show that delayed gossip does not rule it out. We further prove that, under our network model, histories requiring opposite transaction orders can produce identical receipt evidence. Thus, receipt-only mechanisms cannot always preserve earlier-submission priority while preventing responsive overtaking. We propose a mitigation and analyze its assumptions and limitations. Finally, we evaluate the attack and mitigation on Themis through simulations driven by AWS and WonderProxy latency measurements.
作者备注:22 pages
观测到的版本
相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。
v1 · 2026-11-19 21:33 · 最新观测版本
Causal Overtaking in Fair Transaction Ordering
Fair transaction ordering protocols aim to mitigate front-running using replica-local arrival orders, but prior work often assumes a single submission origin for each responsive transaction. We identify causal overtaking, in which corrupted replicas observe a target and submit identical signed copies of a responsive transaction through multiple client entries. The copies' first arrivals at different replicas can collectively provide ordering support that no individual path achieves, allowing the response to execute before its target. We formalize a class of receipt-order protocols, including Themis, characterize the timing and network conditions under which the attack is feasible, and show that delayed gossip does not rule it out. We further prove that, under our network model, histories requiring opposite transaction orders can produce identical receipt evidence. Thus, receipt-only mechanisms cannot always preserve earlier-submission priority while preventing responsive overtaking. We propose a mitigation and analyze its assumptions and limitations. Finally, we evaluate the attack and mitigation on Themis through simulations driven by AWS and WonderProxy latency measurements.
查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗