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arXiv:2611.26212 · v1

The Necessity of Acceptance & Rejection in Inferential Reasoning

首次提交 2026-11-19 22:51
版本更新 2026-11-19 22:51
雷达观测 2026-11-20 14:52
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摘要

In this paper, we argue that acceptance and rejection constitute two fundamental positions necessary for inferential reasoning. Our central thesis is that a proposition acquires an inferential role when it is considered from a position of acceptance or rejection, rather than purely understood as propositional content. We distinguish between understanding a proposition, entertaining it hypothetically, and employing it within an inference. Particular attention is given to hypothetical reasoning and suspended judgement, which appear to challenge the necessity of adopting either position. We maintain that these cases do not undermine our thesis, since inferential reasoning can involve provisional acceptance or rejection without requiring personal belief or permanent commitment. Accordingly, the necessity of these positions should be understood as inferential rather than psychological. By examining the relationship between propositional content, inferential positions, and rational commitment, we defend the view that acceptance and rejection provide the fundamental conditions under which propositions can function within reasoning. This establishes a philosophical foundation for understanding inference through opposed rational positions.

作者备注:11 Pages

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v1 · 2026-11-19 22:51 · 最新观测版本

The Necessity of Acceptance & Rejection in Inferential Reasoning

In this paper, we argue that acceptance and rejection constitute two fundamental positions necessary for inferential reasoning. Our central thesis is that a proposition acquires an inferential role when it is considered from a position of acceptance or rejection, rather than purely understood as propositional content. We distinguish between understanding a proposition, entertaining it hypothetically, and employing it within an inference. Particular attention is given to hypothetical reasoning and suspended judgement, which appear to challenge the necessity of adopting either position. We maintain that these cases do not undermine our thesis, since inferential reasoning can involve provisional acceptance or rejection without requiring personal belief or permanent commitment. Accordingly, the necessity of these positions should be understood as inferential rather than psychological. By examining the relationship between propositional content, inferential positions, and rational commitment, we defend the view that acceptance and rejection provide the fundamental conditions under which propositions can function within reasoning. This establishes a philosophical foundation for understanding inference through opposed rational positions.

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