← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.26436 · v1
When lies look like noise: certifying untrusted entanglement swapping
首次提交 2026-11-20 01:10
版本更新 2026-11-20 01:10
雷达观测 2026-11-20 12:52
摘要
Entanglement swapping lets quantum repeaters distribute entanglement over long distances, a prerequisite for the quantum internet. We study its security in a noisy network whose intermediate nodes perform the quantum operations faithfully but may misreport the classical outcome that end users rely on. We show that the ideal functionality of entanglement swapping cannot be realised, because it gives the adversary no influence over the delivered state, whereas a node that relabels its report does have such influence. Including honest noise in the ideal setting does not help unless it also concedes a bounded fraction of misreported pairs. We therefore propose a cut-and-choose protocol that tests a random subset of pairs to certify the rest. Since no test can distinguish a misreport from readout noise, the protocol certifies the error above a pre-agreed minimum noise level, which is the misreport rate under our threat model. This yields a quality-of-service guarantee, in which a failure witnesses that the node did not deliver as agreed. Unlike verification schemes that consume the state they certify, the untested pairs remain available for use, with a finite-size guarantee. Certifying a 1% misreport rate on 10^6 pairs costs 10^4 to 1.7x10^5 test pairs, for minimum noise levels ranging from 0 to 5%. The main cost is memory, since 1% requires holding 10^5 to 10^6 pairs at once, far beyond the capacity of today's quantum memories. Verifying and releasing in blocks ties the memory to the block size at the cost of a weaker rate: a (10^4)-qubit memory certifies 14% on 4.7x10^5 delivered pairs.
作者备注:30 pages, 3 figure, 5 tables
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v1 · 2026-11-20 01:10 · 最新观测版本
When lies look like noise: certifying untrusted entanglement swapping
Entanglement swapping lets quantum repeaters distribute entanglement over long distances, a prerequisite for the quantum internet. We study its security in a noisy network whose intermediate nodes perform the quantum operations faithfully but may misreport the classical outcome that end users rely on. We show that the ideal functionality of entanglement swapping cannot be realised, because it gives the adversary no influence over the delivered state, whereas a node that relabels its report does have such influence. Including honest noise in the ideal setting does not help unless it also concedes a bounded fraction of misreported pairs. We therefore propose a cut-and-choose protocol that tests a random subset of pairs to certify the rest. Since no test can distinguish a misreport from readout noise, the protocol certifies the error above a pre-agreed minimum noise level, which is the misreport rate under our threat model. This yields a quality-of-service guarantee, in which a failure witnesses that the node did not deliver as agreed. Unlike verification schemes that consume the state they certify, the untested pairs remain available for use, with a finite-size guarantee. Certifying a 1% misreport rate on 10^6 pairs costs 10^4 to 1.7x10^5 test pairs, for minimum noise levels ranging from 0 to 5%. The main cost is memory, since 1% requires holding 10^5 to 10^6 pairs at once, far beyond the capacity of today's quantum memories. Verifying and releasing in blocks ties the memory to the block size at the cost of a weaker rate: a (10^4)-qubit memory certifies 14% on 4.7x10^5 delivered pairs.
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