跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.1397 · 记录 #1

Beyond Explicit Refusals: Soft-Failure Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation

来源日期(仅到月份) 2026-07
来源记录日期 2026-07
雷达观测 2026-11-01 21:53
ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Existing jamming attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems typically induce explicit refusals or denial-of-service behaviors, which are conspicuous and easy to detect. In this work, we formalize a subtler availability threat, termed soft failure, which degrades system utility by inducing fluent and coherent yet non-informative responses rather than overt failures. We propose Deceptive Evolutionary Jamming Attack (DEJA), an automated black-box attack framework that generates adversarial documents to trigger such soft failures by exploiting safety-aligned behaviors of large language models. DEJA employs an evolutionary optimization process guided by a fine-grained Answer Utility Score (AUS), computed via an LLM-based evaluator, to systematically undermine the certainty of answers while maintaining high retrieval success.Extensive experiments across multiple RAG configurations and benchmark datasets show that DEJA consistently drives responses toward low-utility soft failures and that the resulting adversarial documents maintain high stealth and effectiveness, proving resilient against common mitigation strategies including perplexity-based detection and input perturbations.

论文发现出处

这些页面提供论文线索,不代表同行评审或质量认证。

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

发表信息与关联版本

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

平台记录号代表本站观测到的元数据变化,不是作者修订号。来源日期仅到月份或年份时,按该月或该年首日存档。

记录 #1 · 2026-07 · 最新观测版本

Beyond Explicit Refusals: Soft-Failure Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Existing jamming attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems typically induce explicit refusals or denial-of-service behaviors, which are conspicuous and easy to detect. In this work, we formalize a subtler availability threat, termed soft failure, which degrades system utility by inducing fluent and coherent yet non-informative responses rather than overt failures. We propose Deceptive Evolutionary Jamming Attack (DEJA), an automated black-box attack framework that generates adversarial documents to trigger such soft failures by exploiting safety-aligned behaviors of large language models. DEJA employs an evolutionary optimization process guided by a fine-grained Answer Utility Score (AUS), computed via an LLM-based evaluator, to systematically undermine the certainty of answers while maintaining high retrieval success.Extensive experiments across multiple RAG configurations and benchmark datasets show that DEJA consistently drives responses toward low-utility soft failures and that the resulting adversarial documents maintain high stealth and effectiveness, proving resilient against common mitigation strategies including perplexity-based detection and input perturbations.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗