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The Stackelberg Speaker: Optimizing Persuasive Communication in Social Deduction Games
来源日期（仅到月份） 2026-07
来源记录日期 2026-07
雷达观测 2026-11-01 22:04
摘要
Large language model (LLM) agents have shown remarkable progress in social deduction games (SDGs). However, existing approaches primarily focus on information processing and strategy selection, overlooking the significance of persuasive communication in influencing other players’ beliefs and responses. In SDGs, success depends not only on making correct deductions but also on convincing others to respond in alignment with one’s intent. To address this limitation, we formalize turn-based dialogue in SDGs as a Stackelberg competition, where the current player acts as the leader who strategically influences the follower’s response. Building on this theoretical foundation, we propose a reinforcement learning framework that trains agents to optimize utterances for persuasive impact. Through comprehensive experiments across four diverse social deduction benchmarks, we demonstrate that our agents significantly outperform baselines. This work represents a significant step toward developing AI agents capable of strategic social influence, with implications extending to scenarios requiring persuasive communication. Our code and data are available at https://3dagentworld.github.io/leader_follower.
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记录 #1 · 2026-07 · 最新观测版本
The Stackelberg Speaker: Optimizing Persuasive Communication in Social Deduction Games
Large language model (LLM) agents have shown remarkable progress in social deduction games (SDGs). However, existing approaches primarily focus on information processing and strategy selection, overlooking the significance of persuasive communication in influencing other players’ beliefs and responses. In SDGs, success depends not only on making correct deductions but also on convincing others to respond in alignment with one’s intent. To address this limitation, we formalize turn-based dialogue in SDGs as a Stackelberg competition, where the current player acts as the leader who strategically influences the follower’s response. Building on this theoretical foundation, we propose a reinforcement learning framework that trains agents to optimize utterances for persuasive impact. Through comprehensive experiments across four diverse social deduction benchmarks, we demonstrate that our agents significantly outperform baselines. This work represents a significant step toward developing AI agents capable of strategic social influence, with implications extending to scenarios requiring persuasive communication. Our code and data are available at https://3dagentworld.github.io/leader_follower.
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