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ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.801 · 记录 #1

Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks

来源日期(仅到月份) 2026-07
来源记录日期 2026-07
雷达观测 2026-11-01 21:58
ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗

摘要

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become indispensable assistants, they remain vulnerable to misuse. Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods suffer from significant limitations. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose AGILE, a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a one-shot, scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage utilizes information from the model’s hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model’s internal representation of the input from a malicious one toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AGILE achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and AGILE exhibits excellent transferability to black-box and large-scale models. Our code is available at https://github.com/SELGroup/AGILE.

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记录 #1 · 2026-07 · 最新观测版本

Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become indispensable assistants, they remain vulnerable to misuse. Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods suffer from significant limitations. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose AGILE, a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a one-shot, scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage utilizes information from the model’s hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model’s internal representation of the input from a malicious one toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AGILE achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and AGILE exhibits excellent transferability to black-box and large-scale models. Our code is available at https://github.com/SELGroup/AGILE.

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