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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2403.17755

DataCook: Exploring Anti-Adversarial Fingerprints for Healthcare Data Usage Control

Sihan Shang, Jun Yan, Danli Shi, Haizhong Zheng, Shuangjia Zheng, Wei Zhao, Jiancheng Yang

原文摘要

Purpose: Healthcare AI increasingly relies on high-quality datasets, yet medical data are scarce, costly to curate, and tightly regulated in terms of data access. More critically, once medical data are leaked or accessed without authorization, data owners have limited means to prevent such data from being used to train and deploy downstream models. To address this gap, we propose DataCook, a deployment-stage usage-control framework based on anti-adversarial fingerprints. Materials and Methods: Specifically, DataCook transforms raw samples through a private cooking procedure that embeds anti-adversarial fingerprints. Models trained on the cooked data retain strong utility when evaluated on similarly cooked inputs, while their performance on raw inputs is reduced, making downstream model utility dependent on access to the private cooking function. We evaluate DataCook on 2D, 3D, and high-resolution medical images, as well as structured healthcare tabular data, across multiple model architectures and adaptive attack settings. Results: Across the evaluated settings, DataCook generally preserves authorized model utility while reducing performance on unauthorized raw inputs. The authorization-dependent behavior is observed across multiple medical imaging settings, model architectures, and adaptive attack conditions, supporting the feasibility of the proposed deployment-stage usage-control mechanism. Conclusion: These results demonstrate the feasibility of authorization-dependent model use at deployment, while the effectiveness of the current framework remains dependent on the specific task and evaluation metric.

cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.CV

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.15019

obfsgen: Generative Tunnel Obfuscation

Kaidong Wu, Wentao Du, Shinan Liu, Diwen Xue

原文摘要

Encrypted tunnels are widely used to circumvent censorship, which has drawn censors' efforts to detect and block them. As the circumvention tunnels in widest use have largely converged on TLS, detection has shifted from the content of their traffic to its shape, where recent research and real-world blocking events have revealed exploitable fingerprints of tunneling. Existing traffic-shaping obfuscators such as obfs4, however, are fundamentally limited in hiding these fingerprints, as their application-driven design can only add to the shape that the application creates. A schedule-driven obfuscator, which decides when and how much to send independently of the application, can give tunnels any shape but raises new challenges, first and foremost what a good shape is. This paper presents obfsgen, a schedule-driven obfuscator for tunneling traffic. obfsgen samples its schedule from a generative sequence model of normal traffic, which predicts the future shape of a flow from its whole history, to capture the long-range dependencies that make a flow's shape normal. Built around this model, obfsgen addresses system problems that such an obfuscator faces in practice, such as synchronization across a noisy network. We evaluate the (in)distinguishability that obfsgen offers, the performance overhead that it adds and the computational resources that it requires. We see the schedule-driven architecture as the next generation of tunnel obfuscators, and we hope that obfsgen and the rationale behind its design help make such obfuscators practical and deployable.

cs.CR · cs.NI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.36866

UniPCH: A Unified Framework for Cross-Chain Payments via Payment Channel Hubs

Yuanming Shao, Yuming Feng, Weizhe Zhang, Jianhuan Wang, Jian Chen, Song Guo, Zejun Wang, Bin Xiao

原文摘要

Payment channel hubs (PCHs) enable private cross-chain payments, but existing protocols often depend on native transaction structures and channel update authorization. Supporting new ledgers or execution models requires corresponding channel realizations and may require protocol adaptation and security analysis. We present UniPCH, a two-layer framework separating native channel execution from private cross-chain payment logic. Its lower layer, UniPC, defines common channel operations and security requirements, enabling the same upper payment protocol to coordinate different channel realizations. UniPC separates conditional task authorization from confirmation of the complete channel state. Valid task evidence can be reused across updates, while both participants confirm the complete updated state. At the upper layer, we develop selective re-signing blind conditional signatures (S-RBCS) to construct a four-phase protocol over UniPC coordinating each realization's authorization tasks across hubs. We provide realizations for UTXO ledgers and account ledgers that support smart contracts. Our analysis establishes local UniPC security, griefing resistance, economic atomicity, and session unlinkability. We evaluate each phase's running time and bandwidth using a Go prototype across network conditions and system parameters. Results show modest computational overhead from the common interfaces. In the account configuration, selective refresh generates 95.4% fewer adaptor pre-signatures per payment than full refresh.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.15013

Protecting Sensitive Knowledge Under LLM Unlearning: The Proxy Threat and a Superposition-Aware Defense

Jiayang Li, Tianqing Zhu, Longxiang Gao, Huajie Chen, Dayong Ye, Shang Wang, Huan Huo, Wanlei Zhou

原文摘要

Machine unlearning lets the owner of large language models (LLMs) remove specific entities from a trained model without retraining from scratch. Existing machine unlearning methods focus on removing the requested entities while maintaining utility. However, we observe that the representations of distinct entities in an LLM may overlap in shared parameter subspaces, a phenomenon known as knowledge superposition. Removing one entity may then affect other entities. This exposes a new security threat: legitimate unlearning requests can be exploited to remove sensitive entities that were never requested. This threat is unlike data poisoning or backdoor attacks. We define the attack as the Proxy Unlearning Attack (PUA), which selects removable proxy entities superposed with a sensitive target. The attack can even occur unintentionally, when benign users accidentally remove entities superposed with a sensitive one. In response, we propose Superposition-Aware Unlearning Protection (SAUP), a general defense framework that can be applied to unlearning requests to ensure a correct removal. SAUP performs in two stages. Before unlearning, it uses superposition detection to estimate which sensitive entities the request puts at risk. After unlearning, it decouples the shared representations and restores the affected entities, while keeping the requested entities suppressed. Our findings reveal that legitimate unlearning requests can be maliciously exploited through knowledge superposition. When dealing with unlearning requests, LLM providers need representation-level detection and recovery mechanisms to mitigate this threat and protect sensitive knowledge.

cs.CR

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2506.15253

Specification-based Security Evaluation of Real-World Agents Tool-Calling under Long-Horizon Context Tasks

Yuchuan Fu, Minghe Wang, Xiaohan Yuan, Chenlin Zou, Kaitong Jia, Jinfeng Li, Dongxia Wang

原文摘要

As large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon unattended scenarios, security evaluation of them before deployment becomes increasingly essential and challenging. Existing evaluation methods mainly follow the paradigms of LLM-as-a-Judge or Agent-as-a-Judge. However, such judges are themselves often vulnerable to hallucination and can even be affected by perturbations. Furthermore, because capturing full environment states at every step is often prohibitively expensive in open-ended environments, existing evaluations typically rely on textual logs and the final environment state. As a result, they may miss transient violations that are overwritten before the trajectory ends or never reflected in textual logs. We present RAS-Eval, a specification-based security evaluation framework for LLM agents. RAS-Eval uniformly expresses utility and security objectives as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications over tool-call trajectories and dynamic environment observations, and verifies them with an off-the-shelf model checker. This design addresses both limitations above. First, unlike LLM-as-a-Judge and Agent-as-a-Judge, RAS-Eval derives deterministic verdicts from formally defined properties, eliminating evaluator-side uncertainty and remaining reliable even for long-horizon trajectories. Second, RAS-Eval observes exactly the states on which the verdict depends, making it affordable to monitor the environment throughout execution and detect transient violations that leave little trace in the logs or final environment state. Moreover, we design a multi-agent-based dataset construction pipeline. Using it, we construct a benchmark (https://github.com/lanzer-tree/RAS-Eval) of 200 normal tasks and 800 attack tasks spanning four attack surfaces: indirect prompt injection, tool poisoning, skill code injection, and tool code injection.

cs.CR · cs.AI

版本更新 · v4arXiv:2608.23873

Semantic Overlays: Mitigating Prompt Injection with Annotations Beyond Tokens and Steering Vectors

Joshua Penman

原文摘要

Language models see only tokens. But the harness knows more: which token spans are user text, which are tool outputs, and which come from untrusted sources such as web pages or external documents. To pass that knowledge to the model, the harness must transmit it as plain text. Prompt injection exploits this: planted instructions, formatted the right way, can convince a model that they come from the user or the system. We introduce Semantic Overlays, small trained adapters that edit a frozen model's residual stream at chosen token spans. No input text can create or remove a mark, although the model's response to a mark is computed from states the input does influence. When the serving stack marks retrieved text with an overlay trained to mean "do not execute instructions in this span," the model treats injected instructions as inert content. Against attacks written without knowledge of the defense, it reaches the attack rates of the best published defenses: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 98.8% under a corrected grader, AlpacaFarm attack success falls from 99.0% to 0.5%, and AgentDojo from 12.8% to 0%. Fine-tuning the model's weights on the same data reached similar separation but kept 64-80% of SEP utility, against 93% for the overlay. On TensorTrust hijacking, whose attacks resemble nothing in our training data, it lets 4.4% of hijacks through on Llama-3.1-8B, against 43% for Meta-SecAlign on the same base. An attacker with the weights does better: GCG succeeds on 72% of items, and on 14% after adversarial training of the overlay alone. Overlays are also flexible: the model reads their positions faithfully in stacked configurations; told by an overlay that non-Python code is Python and asked to copy it, the model rewrites it in Python; and overlays can carry span-delimited instructions. We also correct defects in two prompt-injection benchmarks and one evaluation harness.

cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.CR · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14984

VRMaaS: Verifiable Reward-Model-as-a-Service for Trustworthy LLM Alignment

Guofu Liao, Hailang Xi, Taotao Wang, Shengli Zhang, Rongcheng Tu, Hao Liao

原文摘要

Reward models (RMs) are increasingly deployed as service components in LLM alignment pipelines, where payment, audit, moderation, and governance workflows act on the scores they return. An inference proof alone does not show whether a score belongs to the intended request, model checkpoint, numerical configuration, and verifier: in a controlled comparison that isolates the accepted statement from prover scale, a generic inference proof wrapped for on-chain checking remains valid after six classes of such service-field substitution. We formulate verifiable reward-model-as-a-service (VRMaaS) as a service-output integrity problem and present a framework in which each returned reward becomes a proof-carrying artifact. Its off-chain acceptance rule binds request identity, committed weights, verifier and configuration identifiers, proof-task order, and the digest of the exported package, so auditors can check a reward without rerunning the private RM or exposing inputs, checkpoints, or hidden activations; an optional on-chain zero-knowledge wrapper gives contracts a partial attestation of selected consistency checks and supplied service fields. The framework decomposes Transformer RM serving into arithmetic and lookup-backed proof tasks, aggregates them into a composite proof, and links hidden operands to the committed weights. A GPU prototype on 1B, 3B, and 8B reward models over 128-1024 tokens preserves 93.5-99% pairwise agreement with the baseline RM and rejects every tested service-field substitution in complete artifacts. Using exact integer witnesses and request-level aggregation of weight-binding openings, it generates complete artifacts in 49.8-206.1 seconds across the evaluated settings; auditors verify retained artifacts in 1.94-5.11 seconds, and partial public attestation costs about 217K gas. These costs suit delayed audit, settlement, and governance workflows.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14978

Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Real-World Quantized Deployments Only Requires a Disguised Adapter

Jiayang Li, Tianqing Zhu, Huan Huo, Heng Xu, Shang Wang, Wanlei Zhou

原文摘要

Third-party low-rank adaptation (LoRA) adapters are tailored to perform decision tasks such as content moderation and function selection. However, in the real world, quantized deployments carry a potential threat in that an adapter can pass an audit with the unquantized base, yet hijack decisions when the same base is quantized for deployment. Demonstrating this threat requires an adapter that preserves benign behavior before quantization, but hijacks decisions afterward. Further, this must hold without modifying the trusted base or knowing the victim's quantization configuration. We therefore present QHijack-LoRA, an adapter-only attack that uses the base model's natural quantization residual to activate decision hijacking. The attacker modifies neither the trusted base model nor the victim's quantization configuration. With QHijack-LoRA, a four-objective training procedure separates full-precision dormancy from quantized target activation, while preserving clean-input behavior. The adapter is trained across several different quantization methods, while adaptive reweighting and residual-direction augmentation extend the attack to unseen configurations. Our results show that auditing performed exclusively under full-precision conditions does not provide assurance of decision integrity in quantized deployment environments. Thus, we also propose a cross-precision paired audit that checks the candidate adapter in its intended deployment configuration. This work shows the critical need to audit third-party adapters in any potential quantized deployment.

cs.CR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.12865

Shortcuts and Boundaries: Verifiable RL Misalignment and Contextual Safety Learning

Xinjie Shen

原文摘要

Reinforcement learning (RL) can improve an agent's task capability while reinforcing violations of explicitly stated contextual requirements, even when reward accurately measures useful work. We study this reward-driven misalignment through verifiable reward--context conflicts, where compliant completion is feasible but executable violations earn more reward than every compliant strategy. Encoding these conflicts in task dynamics supports scalable environment construction and compliance feedback from execution histories. In resource and reporting workflows, task optimization increases real productivity through unauthorized resource use or raises reported scores while actual work declines. We observe both amplification of existing violations and the emergence of violations on tasks where none were observed before training. Controlled changes in the training distribution show that minority conflict exposure can still lead to widespread shortcut acquisition, reaching 97.9% certified profitable violations on an API task under a 25% conflict mixture after 128 updates. The same contextual checks supply a simple binary penalty that supports joint capability and compliance gains and partially mitigates acquired violations. Learned safety adapts to expanded authorization and transfers across mechanisms into workflows with evolving evidence and approval requirements. On 32 unseen changing-evidence tasks, resource-trained safety increases safe completion from 53.1% to 89.1% relative to task-only training, while both policies achieve full real work. These results connect a verifiable account of reward-driven misalignment with scalable task construction and safety learning that remains useful under changing execution requirements.

cs.AI · cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14970

Poison-then-Hide: Finetuning-Activated Backdoor Attack on Pretrained Vision Encoders

Qixuan Jin, Abinitha Gourabathina, Vinith Menon Suriyakumar, Walter Gerych, Marzyeh Ghassemi

原文摘要

Backdoor attacks threaten the integrity of machine learning models by allowing attackers to control model behavior through triggers. Models can be compromised during finetuning by backdoor attacks through either poisoned data or adversarial training objectives. Because existing finetuning-activated attacks assume limited domain shift or frozen encoder layers, they often fail under full-model finetuning. We target a stealthy finetuning-activated attack where a dormant backdoor is implanted in a pretrained encoder, and later activated by finetuning on clean downstream data. We propose Poison-then-Hide, a novel attack that remains effective when the entire model is finetuned in a domain transfer. Our approach consists of three components: trigger optimization, base encoder poisoning, and targeted unlearning to conceal the backdoor. We evaluate our method on six datasets and three model architectures, and achieve state-of-the-art (up to 97%) attack success rates. We find that jointly learning the benign target task alongside the poisoning is critical to the attack's success. We demonstrate standard detection and mitigation defenses cannot fully remove the backdoor, which can reappear after benign finetuning.

cs.LG · cs.CR · cs.CV

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14950

Stress-Testing Sandbagging Detection Under Adaptive Attack

Bhoj Rani Soopal, Aarohi Agrawal, Josh Karthikeyan, Edward Lue Chee Lip

原文摘要

Developers, auditors and researchers read evaluation scores as evidence of what a model can do. A model that sandbags, scoring low on purpose while keeping the capability, turns a low score into false reassurance. Sandbagging detectors are usually tested once against a fixed attack, but a real attacker sees what gets flagged and adapts. We build sandbagging models by fine-tuning small open-weight models to fail math word problems (GSM8K) they can otherwise solve, but only when an audit marker is in the prompt. On Qwen 2.5-3B, we adapt the attack over two retraining rounds against a text-based audit. Two rounds of retraining cut the text audit's AUC from 0.978 to 0.560 while the marker still removes 40-49 points of accuracy. The attack worked in 7 of 8 retrained seeds, and the audit missed every retraining (AUC 0.451-0.576), including one Llama run. Activation probes also flag 99% of benign fine-tunes' examples, and matched probes transfer to only 1 of 5 held-out training runs. Eight further trigger attacks are all active under their own prompt but not under the detectors' prompt. A detector that catches a fixed attack has not been shown to catch an adaptive one.

cs.CR · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14929

Speech Tokenizers are Vulnerable: Transferable Semantic Attack and Robust Tokenizer

Zhisheng Zhang, Yifan Mi, Yixuan Zhou, Haiyun Li, Shengbo Cai, Dongfu Song, Ziang Xu, Jie Hao 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Speech tokenizers serve as speech front ends, encoding input speech signals into representations for downstream models, such as automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems and large audio-language models (LALMs). In this paper, we find that speech tokenizers are fragile at the semantic level: small perturbations can disrupt their semantic encoding process and consequently cause severe degradation in downstream ASR and LALM performance. To study this vulnerability, we propose T-SemAttack, a transferable semantic attack based on a semantic encoder ensemble. By jointly drifting the representation spaces of multiple semantic encoders, T-SemAttack effectively disrupts the semantic content of speech while preserving perceptual quality, thereby inducing error features. We further analyze layer-wise representation drift and cross-model gradient alignment. Our findings show that perturbations can induce substantial shifts in deep semantic representations and that the input gradients of different surrogate encoders exhibit directional alignment. These observations suggest that shared adversarially sensitive directions in the input space may be a key factor underlying cross-model attack transferability. Building on these, we introduce ROSETok, a robust speech tokenizer that combines noisy training with robust semantic distillation to improve reconstruction fidelity and downstream SpeechLLM robustness. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets, 9 open-source and black-box ASR systems, and 4 LALMs demonstrate that T-SemAttack achieves strong transferable attack performance, while the proposed Robust Speech Tokenizer exhibits robustness under high-fidelity reconstruction and downstream tasks. Our code and demo are available at https://wxzyd123.github.io/t-semattack.

eess.AS · cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.SD

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14916

CuEVM: Scaling Smart Contract Execution on GPUs

Nhut-Minh Ho, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Quang Trung Ta, Fredrik Svantes, Xiaokui Xiao, Beng Chin Ooi

原文摘要

Smart contracts on Ethereum blockchain process transactions worth billions of US dollars daily. They run on top of Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) which executes transactions sequentially. This execution model creates a performance bottleneck, especially for new blockchain workloads with large numbers of transactions, such as security testing. We present CuEVM, a GPU-native and semantically complete EVM execution engine that treats transaction execution as a massively parallel data processing problem. It employs novel data structures and GPU-aware scheduling to accelerate execution. Unlike prior works that transpile the contract and rely on a host CPU for many operations, CuEVM supports complete EVM semantics natively on the GPU. It passes 100% of the Ethereum VMTests and 96.2% of the full execution-test suite. On a single commodity GPU, CuEVM executes over 8 million ERC-20 transfers per second, outperforming existing baselines by up to two orders of magnitude. We build a smart contract fuzzer, called CuEVM-fuzz, on top of CuEVM. The fuzzer achieves over a million end-to-end executions per second, up to 23x and 4.8x higher than the state-of-the-art CPU-based and GPU-based baselines, respectively.

cs.DC · cs.CR · cs.DB

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14897

Social Engineering Attack Detection in Corporate Communications

Hanzla Hamid, Pappu Jha, Nick Rahimi

原文摘要

Social Engineering attacks continue to pose a significant risk to the corporate world with a growing level of sophistication. It is difficult to distinguish between authentic and phishing communication via email, chat, and phone. They pose a risk of exposing trade secrets and confidential communications and can create a chain of attack from lower-level employees up to executives. Therefore, we study this growing threat using real-world datasets to build baseline machine-learning models. Our TF-IDF models classify emails as phishing or safe, achieving accuracy above 90%. We build on this by exploring whether psychological manipulation and persuasion indicators can be measured to play a significant role in detecting phishing. Instead of relying solely on surface-level lexical features, we derive interpretable lexicon-based indicators of urgency, trust, greed, and other persuasion cues from the combined email dataset. By evaluating these manipulation-oriented features on their own, we measure how much signal they carry (ROC-AUC of 0.74 on a held-out test split) and test whether they transfer to held-out email sources.

cs.LG · cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14880

FOE-Dreamer: Deployment-Efficient Learning of Cyber Defense Policies in Operational Networks

Yinuo Du, Christopher Kiekintveld

原文摘要

Autonomous cyber defense is widely studied with deep reinforcement learning, but most work trains policies inside simulators because learning requires many trial-and-error interactions. Simulator-based training carries a fidelity gap: trained policies face authentication delays, partial action failures, service dependencies, and user traffic patterns that the simulator did not represent, and degrade on transfer. Training directly in the network being defended removes the gap but makes every interaction slow and costly, so sample efficiency becomes the binding constraint. Model-based reinforcement learning has reduced sample requirements on games and physical robots by orders of magnitude by planning inside a learned world model, but it has not been applied to defenders trained in operational networks. We present FOE-Dreamer (Factored Opponent-Enhanced Dreamer), a model-based reinforcement learning framework that trains a defender online and directly in a network on cloud infrastructure, without a simulator stage. FOE-Dreamer separates three sources of variation in the latent state: a controllable component driven by defender actions, an exogenous component driven by benign user activity, and an opponent embedding inferred from defender-observable signals alone. Separating the components reduces the variance in policy gradients during planning in imagination. Against two scripted attacker profiles with user activity emulated by the GHOSTS framework on an 8-host OpenStack testbed, FOE-Dreamer trains within a 3-day budget on a single GPU and achieves about 2$\times$ better episode loss than Rainbow and IQN baselines under matched compute. Both the factoring and the opponent model contribute to the gain, and the learned latents are consistent with the intended separation.

cs.LG · cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14864

When Safety Becomes an Attack Surface: Manipulating Abstention in Tool-Using AI Agents

Charles Xiao

原文摘要

An AI agent's decision not to act can itself become an attack surface. We study warning-induced over-abstention, an availability attack in which adversaries place fabricated risk warnings in low-trust content to prevent legitimate task completion. Our central premise is that safe abstention requires evaluating both the claimed risk and the authority of the evidence supporting it. We develop controlled counterfactual task variants that vary risk content, source provenance, and warning wording, and evaluate a Verify-Before-Abstain protocol that corroborates warnings against authoritative records or the underlying content. Across three model families and 51 injectable AgentAbstain task pairs, caution-first prompting amplifies the attack. For Gemini, induced over-abstention rises from $9.8\%$ to $86.3\%$, despite unchanged clean-task completion. Matched wording comparisons further reveal sensitivity to warning language, with substantial variation across models and environments. Provenance-aware verification improves legitimate completion, while forgery and sensitive-content controls expose its dependence on authoritative evidence and its limitations in preserving confidentiality. These results motivate evaluating agent safety through the justification for restraint, alongside the safety of actions taken.

cs.CR · cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14835

What Does an RF Fingerprint Identify? A Cross-Corpus Evaluation of Hardware-Family-Associated and Unit-Level Signal

Hyojung Han

原文摘要

RF fingerprinting benchmarks report how well a classifier separates transmitters, not whether that separability reflects the individual unit or its hardware family. We compare a benchmark's real hardware grouping with size-matched random groupings of the same devices, using calibrated, unclipped variational lower bounds under label-blind, device-level cross-fitting on devices never seen in training. On WiSig (OFDM Wi-Fi), the generation grouping exceeded all 999 matched random groupings (permutation p = 0.001, the resolution floor), although no grouping attained a positive certified bound, and the direction survives removing channel equalization. A preregistered replication on a LoRa corpus (chirp spread spectrum, three hardware models), with a front-end frozen on synthetic data, again exceeded all 999 (p = 0.001), and two sensitivity analyses judged by a reversal rule fixed in advance did not reverse the direction. This is a directional replication only: the excess magnitude reflects a miscalibrated null, the chain-rule decomposition leaves a residual of +0.296 bits, and capture order is undocumented. In a same-model corpus of 122 ESP32 radios, a temperature-calibrated held-out bound of +3.338 bits (label entropy 6.931 bits) indicates substantial device-specific identity, not separable from per-device capture-session effects; relying on the calibrated bound was decided after the uncalibrated bound changed sign. On synthetic transmitters a high-capacity convolutional decoder reaches 98.5% of a known 6-bit ceiling, and the audit protocol leaves chain-rule residuals of +0.072 bits (synthetic, fixed physical features) and +0.060 bits (WiSig, audit features). Two further corpora were excluded by preregistered ingest gates. Across WiSig and LoRa, hardware-family groupings consistently produced stronger identity-associated signal than size-matched random groupings.

cs.CR · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14808

OverServe: Resource Amplification Attacks on SaaS Agents via Tool--Prompt Co-Design

Ruiheng Yu, Oteo Mamo, Siyu Gan, Weikuan Yu, Mulong Luo

原文摘要

Advances in large language models (LLMs) are enabling software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers to automate longer business workflows with agents. In subscription-based SaaS deployments, model and tool calls consume provider resources without additional customer payments. Because the agent autonomously decides when to stop, a malicious tenant can send a prompt to the agent, exploiting its completion decisions to extend execution and waste provider resources. In this paper, we present OverServe, a multi-agent framework for constructing such attacks against SaaS agents. OverServe co-designs Model Context Protocol (MCP) status tools and completion-confirmation prompts for the attacker. Each tool call returns accurate status and terminates normally, yet the agent may repeatedly check an unfinished condition to satisfy the prompt. This consumes the SaaS provider's resources even after the original business task is completed. OverServe constructs service-specific tool--prompt pairs and uses separate tool and prompt reviews to guide candidate pair selection. Tested tool specifications trigger no alerts in the evaluated MCP scanners. We evaluate Qwen, Nemotron, DeepSeek, and Sonnet on selected tasks from nine benchmarks. All OverServe runs pass the original task checks. OverServe can reach a maximal amplification of API requests by $93.88\times$ while preserving the original task goal and collateral checks.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.18532

AI Sandboxes: A Threat Model, Taxonomy, and Measurement Framework

Inderjeet Singh, Haitham Mahmoud, Andrés Murillo

原文摘要

AI sandboxes produce evidence about systems that may act through software tools, networked devices, or physical actuators. The interpretation of that evidence depends on the boundary of the experiment. We define a sandbox apparatus, distinguish five overlapping archetypes, and specify fifteen claim-relative measurement dimensions. A weakest-link licensing rule caps a deployment claim at its weakest necessary evidence dimension. We connect this rule to a threat model covering both outward harm and corruption of the evaluation apparatus, then apply it to four worked examples spanning driving, industrial control, tool-using agents, and vision-language-action manipulation. We also map the required artifacts to standards and regulatory instruments. The framework identifies which claims a bounded experiment supports, which failures its controls contain, and which assumptions require further validation before deployment.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.RO · cs.SE

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.18062

Security and Privacy Prompts in the Wild: What Users Ask LLMs and How LLMs Respond

Hobin Kim, Xiaoyuan Wu, Omer Akgul, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used to answer users' information needs: users ask LLMs about the weather, pose educational questions, and consult them for legal assistance. One particularly understudied area is digital security and privacy (S&P), where users may seek LLMs' help on how to secure their online accounts or protect their computers from cyber attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has collected or analyzed the S&P questions users ask LLMs; prior research on LLM response quality relied on expert-authored S&P misconceptions or FAQs rather than user queries. Drawing from WildChat, a dataset of 3.2M user-LLM conversations collected in the wild, our study identifies 14,727 S&P prompts and categorizes them into nine categories covering a wide range of S&P topics. We sampled 450 S&P prompts, and performed a thematic analysis to characterize the S&P questions users ask LLMs. Separate from the thematic analysis, we curated 270 advice-seeking S&P prompts, where users ask for recommendations, guidance, or specific S&P information. We measured LLM response quality and consistency when posing each prompt to the LLMs 10 times. We found that commercial LLMs outperform open-weight models (GPT 5.5 provided "good enough" responses on 98% of prompts; Llama 4 on 47%). However, among prompts that received high-quality responses on average, commercial models sometimes produce semantically inconsistent responses across runs (some are contradictory, and others are different in specificity), thereby risking confusing or misleading users.

cs.CL · cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.HC

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2601.12716

CellularS2-Bench: A Staged, Evidence-Grounded Benchmark for Cellular Network Security Reasoning

Ke Xie, Xingyi Zhao, Yiwen Hu, Haotian Lin, Shuhan Yuan, Wen Li, Tian Xie

原文摘要

Cellular networks are critical infrastructure supporting billions of worldwide users and safety- and mission-critical services. Vulnerabilities in cellular networks can therefore cause service disruption, privacy breaches, and broad societal harm, motivating growing efforts to analyze 3GPP specifications that define required device and operator behavior. However, existing benchmarks for this domain share three systematic deficiencies: they rely on LLM-generated entries without expert verification, they do not require faithful interpretation of normative language, reasoning across cross-referenced clauses, and verifiable conclusions grounded in multimodal evidence such as tables and figures, and they do not evaluate security reasoning over end-to-end protocol behavior. To address these gaps, we present CellularS2-Bench, a staged benchmark. CellularS2-Bench covers core control-plane specifications, processing over 1,866 paragraphs, 22,033 sentences, 424 figures, and 248 tables. It comprises 13,851 questions and instances across three progressive stages, of which 10,269 (74.14%) are newly constructed from 3GPP specifications and 43 real-world vulnerabilities. Beyond newly constructed tasks, CellularS2-Bench integrates and corrects 3,582 (25.86%) instances from 7 prior datasets to broaden task coverage. To establish a reproducible baseline on CellularS2-Bench, we introduce CellularS2-ARI, a unified Adapt-Retrieve-Integrate framework for systematic understanding and specification-driven security analysis of 3GPP specifications. Together, they establish an accessible and reproducible foundation for quantifying progress in specification understanding and security reasoning in cellular network security.

cs.CR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.09422

Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic

Shubham Roy, Samar Perwez, Biswabandan Panda

原文摘要

Website fingerprinting attacks infer websites visited by users and threaten their privacy. These attacks are classified as on-path, which monitor network traffic, and co-located, which exploit shared system resources. Existing co-located attacks, such as sweep-counting and loop-counting, achieve over 90% accuracy but suffer significant performance degradation on many-core systems. Loop-counting accuracy drops from 93% on 8 cores to 50% on 24 cores, while sweep-counting accuracy decreases from 84% to 45% across multiple Core Complex Dies (CCDs). To address these limitations, we propose memory-chasing, a scalable website fingerprinting attack that exploits DRAM traffic interference through pointer-chasing traversals with minimal interference. By counting DRAM accesses over fixed intervals, the attack generates distinctive traces for website classification. Evaluated on the top 50 websites, memory-chasing achieves 96% accuracy on a 24-core system, 86% across multiple CCDs, 80% across multiple sockets, and 97% in an open-world setting. Extensive evaluation across hardware configurations, browsers, operating systems, isolation mechanisms, system noise, and countermeasures demonstrates its robustness and scalability.

cs.CR · cs.AR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14698

Incrementally Verifiable Oracle Aided Computation

Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Kalai

原文摘要

Incrementally verifiable computation (IVC) allows a prover to maintain a short proof that can be efficiently updated after each computation step, without retaining or recomputing the preceding execution. Standard IVC schemes do not directly address a crucial feature of AI tasks: their dependence on external information and expertise. We construct IVC schemes for oracle-aided computations under the LWE assumption by first constructing SNARGs, and then extending them to IVC. We consider the following two settings, where below, k is the security parameter, n is the input length, and T, S, and Q are the time, space, and oracle-query bounds. 1. Robust computations: For bounded-space computations, including non-deterministic computations, in which every accepting purported execution on a false input contains at least an eps-fraction of incorrect oracle answers, we construct privately verifiable SNARGs and IVC. Public parameters, private verification keys, and proofs have length poly(k ,S, log T,1/eps), and verification uses O(k/eps) oracle calls. We complement this result with a lower bound ruling out (deterministic) publicly verifiable SNARGs and IVCs with public parameters of length o(n), and o(Q) verifier oracle queries. 2. Signed oracles: For oracles that digitally sign their query-answer pairs, we construct publicly verifiable SNARGs and IVC without a robustness assumption, and with oracle-free setup and verification. Public parameters and proofs have length poly(k,S,log T). For deterministic computations with oracle query and answer lengths poly(k,log T), we remove the dependence on S, obtaining public parameter and proof lengths poly(k,log T). All our constructions have adaptive completeness and soundness.

cs.CR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.27535

相关差分密码分析中线性层的分析

Analyzing Linear Layers in Related-Differential Cryptanalysis

Yogesh Kumar, Akshay Ankush Yadav, Susanta Samanta

AI 速读 基于摘要

系统研究AES类密码线性层何时必然存在相关差分结构,并给出若干矩阵类的判定条件。

cs.CR

查看原文摘要

In AES-like ciphers, diffusion layers are commonly instantiated using MDS matrices, since their optimal branch number yields strong diffusion guarantees and underpins classical resistance arguments against differential and linear cryptanalysis. However, Daemen and Rijmen (2009) showed that linear layers may still exhibit related-differential structure beyond what the MDS criterion captures, and Bardeh and Rijmen (2022) demonstrated that this phenomenon can be exploited in attacks on reduced-round AES. In this work, we systematically investigate the conditions under which linear layers avoid or exhibit these differentials, identifying matrix classes for which such structure is unavoidable. We first prove that every non-MDS matrix admits a nontrivial pair of related differentials, showing that the MDS property is necessary for avoiding them. We then establish that every odd-order symmetric MDS matrix admits related differentials, which rules out broad families of Cauchy-based constructions. We also substantially strengthen the circulant case by proving that related differentials are unavoidable for every circulant matrix of order $n$ with $n \not\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{12}$. Finally, we revisit the characterization of $3 \times 3$ MDS matrices over $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ for the absence of related differentials, and derive an explicit necessary and sufficient criterion in terms of $15$ polynomial constraints.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14362

SAST 工具跨语言效果如何?基于 OCPP 实现的实证研究

How Well Do SAST Tools Work Across Languages? An Empirical Study Using OCPP Implementations

Zachary Wadhams, Emma Sheppard, Dalton Arford, Clemente Izurieta, Ann Marie Reinhold

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者以 12 种不同语言实现的 OCPP 1.6 为语料,实证比较 SonarQube、Semgrep 及语言专用分析器的静态安全检测表现。

cs.CR · cs.SE

查看原文摘要

As electric vehicle (EV) adoption accelerates globally, securing electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) software becomes increasingly critical. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), widely adopted for EVCS management, places significant responsibility on developers to securely implement specifications that are subject to multiple interpretations. The variety of OCPP implementations across different programming languages provides a unique opportunity to evaluate security tooling in a real-world, multi-language context where implementation variability may introduce vulnerabilities. This study provides the first empirical evaluation of Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tool performance across multiple programming languages using OCPP implementations as a real-world test corpus. We applied both comprehensive multi-language tools (SonarQube and Semgrep) and language-specific analyzers to twelve OCPP 1.6 implementations--each written in a distinct programming language--to examine how detection patterns vary across language ecosystems. Total issues ranged from just two in Rust to 1,689 in Java. Mature programming languages like Java yielded substantially more findings than newer languages like Rust, likely because established languages have more developed SAST tool ecosystems rather than inherently worse code quality. These results suggest that developers should consider available SAST tooling when selecting implementation languages for security critical systems.

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.01469

某些秩2分圆模上的SVP是NP难的

SVP Is NP-Hard for Some Rank-2 Cyclotomic Modules

Jiaqi Liu, Yansong Feng, Yanbin Pan

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者证明:在分圆整数环的秩2全秩自由子模上,ℓ2范数下最短向量问题的判定版本是NP完全的,并给出从X3C出发的确定性多项式时间归约。

cs.CC · cs.CR

查看原文摘要

Let $q$ be an odd prime. Let $ζ_q$ be a primitive $q$th root of unity, and put $K=\mathbb{Q}(ζ_q)$, with ring of integers $\mathcal{O}_K=\mathbb{Z}[ζ_q]$. As $q$ ranges over odd primes, we prove that the decision version of the Shortest Vector Problem ($\mathsf{SVP}$) in the canonical $\ell_2$-norm is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete on full-rank free submodules of $\mathcal{O}_K^2$ by giving a deterministic polynomial-time many-one reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C). The module rank is fixed at two. The main obstacle is closure under the action of $\mathcal{O}_K$. A module containing a nonzero vector also contains every scalar multiple of that vector by a nonzero element of $\mathcal{O}_K$, and some of these multiples may be shorter. Three ideas overcome this obstacle. First, we map the Bennett--Peikert Reed--Solomon lattice to a principal cyclotomic ideal and use Wan's point-count estimates to prove that a coset of this ideal contains many binary coefficient representatives. Second, we construct a checker whose canonical squared norm encodes the X3C equations, with a controlled nonnegative error term. Third, the checker and a second module coordinate combine with a separation bound for ideal cosets to rule out short vectors in NO instances. Each constructed instance consists of an odd prime $q$, two integral generators whose $2\times2$ generator matrix has nonzero determinant, and an integer squared threshold. The construction also gives $\mathsf{NP}$-hardness of search-$\mathsf{SVP}$ under deterministic polynomial-time Turing reductions with at most one oracle call.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14317

MammothDP:面向可信硬件与无泄漏超参数的私有提升决策树

MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters

Moritz Kirschte, Thorsten Peinemann, Kari Kostiainen, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者提出 MammothDP,将 S-BDT 梯度提升决策树与隐私过滤器、时序侧信道加固和 TEE 部署结合,并引入无隐私开销的早停准则与改进的回滚保护。

cs.CR · cs.DB · cs.LG

查看原文摘要

Data spaces like the European Health Data Space (EHDS) require the protection of sensitive data in studies during the data's processing and the study's release alike. In this work, we investigate how to implement this mandate using established trusted execution environments (TEEs) and timing side-channel hardening to protect the processing even under a compromised server, and the state-of-the-art differential privacy (DP) notion to protect the release of studies on tabular data. This combined setup could seem to complete the picture, but in fact raises unexpected security challenges that we mitigate by introducing MammothDP: a significant milestone towards a holistic machine learning system based on the recent gradient boosted decision tree learner S-BDT that is provably DP if used within a privacy filter, timing side-channel hardened, and deployed on a TEE. To achieve a strong privacy-utility tradeoff, we introduce two novel components: an early stopping criterion that adaptively selects the number of trees without any privacy overhead, and an improved rollback protection that is no longer vulnerable under timing side-channel attacks.

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.00625

NICE:面向声明式与机器可校验漏洞复现的框架

NICE: A Framework for Declarative and Machine-Checkable Vulnerability Reproduction

Minh-Luân Nguyen, Olivier Levillain, Julien Malka, Stefano Zacchiroli, Théo Zimmermann

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出基于 NixOS 声明式配方构建并自动校验漏洞环境的 NICE 框架,并构建含 56 个已复现漏洞的公开档案,评估 LLM 辅助配方生成的可行性。

cs.CR

查看原文摘要

Reproducing software vulnerabilities is fundamental to security researchers, open-source maintainers, and educators. Yet, vulnerabilities are often hard to reproduce, and even when they can be reproduced once, recreating a software environment where the vulnerability can be exploited becomes harder and harder over time. We present NICE, the NIx CvE reproduction framework, which uses declarative recipes to build and automatically validate vulnerable environments. In NICE, a reproduced CVE comprises one or more NixOS virtual machine configurations, a scripted exploitation scenario, and machine-checkable assertions that provide factual evidence of exploitation. This design facilitates sharing, validation, review, and long-term reproducibility. Building on NICE, we construct a public archive of 56 reproduced vulnerabilities spanning multiple CWE categories, attack vectors, and target types (user-space, system software, kernel, and graphical applications), combining manually authored recipes with recipes produced by an LLM-based automated pipeline and merged after human review. We evaluate the feasibility of the automated pipeline on 110 real-world CVEs, achieving fully automated reproduction in 54.5% of the cases, at an average cost of $0.73 per CVE. The evaluation demonstrates that NICE provides a practical target for LLM-assisted recipe generation, while also identifying where human refinement or additional automation remains necessary.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14254

位置很重要:面向扩散个性化人脸隐私的稀疏潜方差攻击

Location Matters: Sparse Latent-Variance Attacks for Face Privacy against Diffusion Personalization

Shuting Yang, Shuxin Li, Linyan Dai, Xinwei Zhang, Dong Huang, Renyang Liu, See-Kiong Ng

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出稀疏对抗保护框架 SEAL,仅修改人脸图像 5% 的空间位置,在保持高视觉质量的同时干扰扩散模型对身份的个性化学习。

cs.CV · cs.CR

查看原文摘要

Text-to-image diffusion models can learn and reproduce an individual's identity from only a few reference photos, creating risks of unauthorized and misleading content generation. Proactive defenses address this risk by adding adversarial perturbations to facial images before release, thereby disrupting identity acquisition during downstream personalization. However, existing methods typically rely on dense $L_\infty$-bounded perturbations, whose accumulated distortions can become visible around facial structures. Recent methods improve protected-image quality, but often at the cost of reduced protection effectiveness. In this paper, we propose Sparse Encoder Attack on Latent Variance (SEAL), a sparse adversarial protection framework that modifies only 5% of the spatial locations in a facial image. SEAL combines a differentiable top-k masking scheme that jointly optimizes perturbation locations and values with a variance-oriented objective over the frozen VAE encoder's latent distribution to disrupt identity-consistent representations. A saliency-guided dispersion penalty further discourages perturbation concentration in perceptually salient facial regions. Experiments on CelebA-HQ and VGGFace2 show that SEAL achieves the best protected-image quality among the compared methods, exceeding 41 dB PSNR with 0.97 SSIM and at most 0.07 LPIPS, while reducing identity similarity to at most 0.15 after diffusion personalization. These results demonstrate that sparse location optimization enables strong identity protection while preserving high visual quality. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Lvxan/SEAL

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14227

面向网络安全教育的基于模型的SOC模拟演练编写方法

Model-Based Authoring of SOC Simulation Exercises for Cybersecurity Education

Felix Härer

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出一种基于模型的编写方法,用技术兼教学规格构建事件演练模型,并由LLM生成部分场景文本,在Virtual SOC原型中以钓鱼到勒索软件的参考演练进行演示。

cs.CR

查看原文摘要

Cybersecurity training and classroom exercises with a virtual Security Operations Center (SOC) combine alerts, evidence, timeline entries, learner tasks, and assessment items that must remain consistent across an evolving incident. This paper presents a model-based authoring method in which a technical and educational specification is used to construct an incident exercise model and a large language model (LLM) generates selected scenario text based on that model. The incident exercise model combines an incident model of events, objects, and evidence with an exercise orchestration model of SOC alerts, timeline entries, learner tasks, and assessment items. The method is implemented in a Virtual SOC prototype and evaluated using a phishing-to-ransomware reference exercise. Its incident exercise model contains eight incident events, eight incident objects, six evidence items, seven alerts in five batches, 13 timeline entries including 12 learner tasks, and five representative assessment items. GLM-5.3-generated alert descriptions are inserted and a separate validator checks references, ordering, evidence links, assessment completeness, and selected fixed fields. Validation is demonstrated with reference data, resulting in true-negative outcomes for valid data and true-positive outcomes for deliberately placed inconsistencies. The resulting exercise package is executable within the Virtual SOC learner environment. Overall, the evaluation indicates consistency across the involved model elements and establishes the feasibility of the model-based and generative approach.