跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1680新增论文
+1333其中 AI 相关
+187已有论文修订
+59新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-18 04:28 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-17 23:35各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-17 05:38 — 2026-11-18 05:38(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-18 04:28最近发现新增版本:2026-11-17 23:35库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-17 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

25,786 已收录论文21,491 AI 相关7,725 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 3 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-18 04:27(北京时间)
版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.29963

Honeyval: A Comprehensive Evaluation Framework for LLM-powered HTTP Honeypots

Mark Vero, Fabian Kaczmarczyck, Ivan Petrov, Ilia Shumailov, Jamie Hayes, Niels Heinen, Tianqi Fan, Luca Invernizzi 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Honeypots are decoy systems mimicking real system components designed to defend against cyber attacks. Recently, LLMs increasingly serve as simulation backbones for honeypots. They enable defenders to construct high-interaction honeypots with low system security risks. However, LLM-powered honeypot development lacks a unified evaluation framework. Most evaluations consist of measuring response similarity on fixed commands, manual testing, or real-world deployment. These methods are often not scalable for development, reproducible across evaluations, representative of practical attacks, or adaptable to various attacker and honeypot configurations. In this work, we bridge this gap and propose Honeyval, a comprehensive evaluation framework for LLM-powered HTTP honeypots. We address the limitations of prior evaluations by grounding the honeypots in 16 backend applications, using AI hacking agents as attackers, employing two control tasks to monitor agent and honeypot capabilities across customizations, and defining clear and verifiable exploit goals for the attacker. Using Honeyval, we conduct an extensive evaluation of recent cost-efficient LLMs as HTTP honeypots. Our experiments highlight the promise of LLM-powered honeypots; they lead to substantially longer interactions with the attacker than rule-based baseline honeypots and are far less frequently detected even by frontier models, all while, on average, preserving a running cost advantage against agentic attackers. Further, we experiment with various honeypot extensions and counter-offensive configurations, observing unique trade-offs, e.g., lower latency at the price of increased detection.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11861

Scaling Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks with Agent Swarms

Alexey Kurakin, Vishal Karande, Alex Bie, Chongyang Shi, Shuang Song, Saeed Mahloujifar, Abdullatif Köksal, Jamie Hayes 等 11 位作者

原文摘要

Prompt injections have emerged as one of the top security risks faced by AI agents today. Early work in prompt injection attacks looked at simple tool-call agents and static attack payloads, and were saturated since mid-2025. As of Fall 2026, human red-teaming may be nearing saturation, especially on the Gemini family of models. In this work, we argue that despite this apparent plateau, prompt injection attacks are still possible and continued effort into prompt injection defense is needed. We design a new synthetic evaluation dataset which uses random non-malicious actions as adversarial goals. Such dataset design helps us to evaluate prompt injection robustness as a model ability to respect instruction hierarchy, and disentangle this ability from model knowledge of security practices. We show that an agentic attacker of increased capabilities can reliably trick model to follow instructions in tool output in our evaluation, even for models previously considered robust on public prompt injection benchmarks such as GraySwan Arena. This shows that current frontier defenses may require proactive, automated red-teaming to remain resilient to increasingly capable adversaries.

cs.CR · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2301.13188Google Research

Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models

Nicholas Carlini, Jamie Hayes, Milad Nasr, Matthew Jagielski, Vikash Sehwag, Florian Tramèr, Borja Balle, Daphne Ippolito 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Image diffusion models such as DALL-E 2, Imagen, and Stable Diffusion have attracted significant attention due to their ability to generate high-quality synthetic images. In this work, we show that diffusion models memorize individual images from their training data and emit them at generation time. With a generate-and-filter pipeline, we extract over a thousand training examples from state-of-the-art models, ranging from photographs of individual people to trademarked company logos. We also train hundreds of diffusion models in various settings to analyze how different modeling and data decisions affect privacy. Overall, our results show that diffusion models are much less private than prior generative models such as GANs, and that mitigating these vulnerabilities may require new advances in privacy-preserving training.

cs.CR · cs.CV · cs.LG