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原文摘要

Processing-in-Memory places small programmable cores on the memory device, where they execute beside the DRAM banks and beyond the control-flow defenses that protect host programs. The security of this in-memory code is an attack surface that remains largely unstudied. We present PIMROP, to our knowledge the first demonstrated code-reuse attack on a commercial Processing in-Memory ISA. We show that return-oriented programming is feasible on a real, commercially shipped PIM instruction set, the UPMEM DPU, whose DRAM Processing Units run C compiled by a dedicated LLVM toolchain. We build Galileo-for-DPU, a gadget scanner adapted to the DPU's fixed-width, 8-byte-aligned RISC encoding, and run it entirely on the UPMEM functional simulator in a reproducible Docker and VM environment. We find the runtime library that every kernel links already yields 517 non-trivial gadgets covering all five canonical ROP primitive classes, and all 13 PrIM benchmarks we scanned carry gadgets as well. We then demonstrate two verified end-to-end attacks, each reproducible on 10 of 10 runs. In the first, a stack buffer overflow in a DPU kernel overwrites the saved return address and diverts control into a routine that copies a secret into host-readable memory. In the second, we leak the same secret using a chain of reused gadgets alone, without diverting control into any such routine. We further show that two standard defenses--stack canaries and _FORTIFY_SOURCE-style bounds-check fortification--fail on the DPU in ways specific to the platform (misplaced canary, silently inactive wrapper), and we verify a bounds-checked DMA that stops the attack on 10 of 10 runs with no effect on benign requests. To enable further research on PIM security, we open-source Galileo-for-DPU and our testing harness at https://github.com/wtegge2/ROP-in-PIM.