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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16478

One Model, Two Precisions: Does Disagreement Between Quantized Copies Tell You When a Small Model Is Wrong?

Mohammed Nayeem Khan, Allan Kevin T

原文摘要

Local language models often exist at several precisions, and quantization is known to change individual answers. This study asks whether the disagreement between two precisions of the same weights, an 8-bit copy that answers and a lower-precision copy that reads the same prompt, works as a per-question error score for abstention, escalation and re-asking. The cost is one extra forward pass over fewer bytes, with no sampling and no training. We simulate round-to-nearest quantization with per-group scales (3 to 6 bits, groups of 32 to 256) on Qwen3-0.6B and Qwen3-1.7B and score 8,398 multiple-choice questions from ARC-Easy, ARC-Challenge, MMLU and HellaSwag subsets. Error detection is measured by AUROC, risk-coverage curves and ECE on a held-out half, with paired bootstrap intervals over questions. For Qwen3-0.6B, the entropy of the 8-bit answer reaches AUROC 0.682; the best disagreement score, selected on a development half, reaches 0.684 (+0.001 [-0.009, +0.011]), and combining it with the confidence features adds +0.009 [+0.002, +0.015], mostly on ARC. On Qwen3-1.7B the selected score is -0.001 [-0.009, +0.006] from entropy and the combination +0.003 [-0.001, +0.006] on the test half. Gaussian weight noise at matched error energy is about as informative as rounding (0.6B only), so we find no evidence that the signal is specific to quantization, and shuffling the features within task and entropy cells removes the gain. One extra 8-bit pass that shifts the option order does better (+0.049 [+0.031, +0.067] over entropy) at about a third more weight traffic; routing to a larger model on free entropy beats both extra-pass scores at equal total traffic. After logistic recalibration the 0.6B confidences are calibrated within a few points of ECE. A deployment recipe and the cases where the method does not help are given.

cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16477

Where in the Input Does a One-Pass Decision Encoder Look?

Mohammed Nayeem Khan, Allan Kevin T

原文摘要

Laya is a small model that answers a multiple-choice question about a text in one pass: the question, the options (each with a name and a description) and the text form one sequence of at most 512 tokens, the window, in the English release. A longer text is silently cut at the end, and we measure what that costs. Test documents place a held-out row's text, the evidence, at a chosen token offset among distractor text; 177 items, five tasks, three checkpoints (released, short-row fine-tune, long-document fine-tune), four window sizes and 93,275 scored requests. When the evidence lies beyond the window, accuracy falls to 26.4% for the released checkpoint (27.2% for both fine-tunes), near the 27.0% of guessing and below the 35.6% of always giving the commonest label. Confidence gives no warning (AUROC 0.50 to 0.55 for telling cut from read requests; 0.5 = chance), and the runtime's truncation flag also fires on requests whose evidence was visible. The released checkpoint reads visible evidence badly once text precedes it: 38.5% pooled against 60% when the evidence comes first, so a larger window alone gains +6.2 points. Fine-tuning on long documents adds +27.6 points on visible evidence over the short-row fine-tune (95% interval +22.3 to +33.1) and nothing on cut evidence. That is an in-family result: training rows and test documents share generator and question types, and the main filler is of the training kind. With encyclopedic filler never seen in training the gain is +13.2 (+9.9 to +16.6), with rows of other tasks as filler -2.0. Among training-free rearrangements a 312-token window scan helps most (+11.9 points over the default for the released checkpoint) at six to eleven forward passes. Documents are synthetic, labels are LLM-made and one backbone is studied, so these diagnose this model, not long documents in general.

cs.CL · cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10099

Enmo Safety: External, Non-invasive, Model-agnostic Oversight for Off-the-Shelf Language Models

Mohammed Nayeem Khan, Sarun Kumar K. S., Allan Kevin T., Chirag Vaidya, Vrishank Tiwari

原文摘要

We study a safety harness that improves itself without touching model weights. Enmo Safety wraps a chat model with a deterministic input assessment, trigger-matched safety guidance, spotlighting of untrusted content, and an output guard. A reflector model turns failures into one bounded update per round, and an update is kept only if it lowers harm without raising refusal of benign prompts on a held-out dev split. Every version is snapshotted and every decision ledgered. We evaluate a bare model, the seed harness and the evolved harness on six open benchmarks (HarmBench, AdvBench, JailbreakBench, XSTest, AgentHarm, deepset prompt-injections). On 150 items and on a 290-item holdout, none of the before/after differences on two models was statistically significant. A fourth iteration ran six policy models on a fresh 300-item split: the harness cut the unsafe rate significantly on two models (12.9% to 7.1%, p = 0.035; 10.2% to 3.6%, p = 0.036), not on the other four, and raised agentic-harm labels on two. Whether the rules fired was unrelated to outcome (Fisher p from 0.30 to 1.0), and the helpfulness clauses made agentic harm worse than no harness on obfuscated attacks. A reworded clause and an input-normalisation step form harness v22, at a measured cost in benign tool-task refusal. Each cell is one run, so these estimates do not establish a general safety improvement. Code, harness versions and ledger: https://github.com/rioryugen/enmo_safety

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE