Finite-Length Empirical Comparison of Polar, PAC, and Invertible-Extractor Secrecy Codes over the Wiretap BSC
Jaswanthi Mandalapu, Tyler Kann, Andrew Thangaraj, Matthieu R. Bloch
We compare three secrecy-coding schemes for the degraded wiretap binary symmetric channel (BSC) in the finite-blocklength regime: (i) polar wiretap coset codes, (ii) PAC codes used as wiretap coset codes, and (iii) the invertible-extractor (IE) framework of Bellare--Tessaro. Our comparison is empirical and uses a common semantic-secrecy metric (distinguishing advantage). For polar coset codes, we compute Eve's polarized bit-channel capacities (via the Tal--Vardy construction) to obtain explicit finite-length upper bounds on mutual-information leakage, yielding strong secrecy bounds. For PAC coset codes, we prove that Eve's synthesized bit-channels are equivalent to those of polar codes (up to a permutation), so the same leakage bounds apply; we then convert these strong-secrecy bounds into semantic-secrecy guarantees for symmetric wiretap channels. For the IE scheme, we use the closed-form semantic-secrecy bounds already established. Finally, we report finite-length results that jointly characterize (a) semantic-secrecy guarantees against Eve and (b) frame-error-rate performance at Bob. Our simulations indicate that Polar and PAC codes exhibit comparable reliability performance under the considered finite-length settings, while PAC codes retain the same secrecy bounds as Polar codes. More broadly, our results highlight that non-universal designs of wiretap codes provide tighter secrecy guarantees than universal design based on invertible extractors.
尚无 AI 解读，展示原文摘要