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原文摘要

This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretical framework for the financial settlement of real-time deviations in Community-Based Local Energy Markets (CB-LEMs). The real-time settlement process is modeled as a transferable-utility cooperative game, and the resulting Real-Time Local Energy Market (RTLEM) game is shown to be superadditive and balanced. We analyze two game-theoretical allocation mechanisms, the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and evaluate their efficiency, individual rationality, coalitional rationality, and temporal-aggregation properties. We subsequently compare these mechanisms with a settlement rule based on proportional imbalance responsibility. The three mechanisms are efficient and individually rational, but only the nucleolus is guaranteed to satisfy coalitional rationality for every RTLEM instance. The proposed framework is demonstrated using real-world data from a residential energy community in Amsterdam, showing the trade-offs among the three allocation mechanisms in terms of surplus distribution, coalitional stability, interpretability, and computational requirements.