The Quine Test: How Much of a Model's Self Survives Its Own Description?
Bibin Babu, Ivan P. Yamshchikov, Aleksei Shpilman
Frontier language models express coherent preferences, but behavioral evidence alone cannot say whether these belong to the model or to a character it portrays. Following Hofstadter's view of the self as a self-description, we ask whether a model's description of itself works as a portable specification of its preference profile, a quine test: can the text a model writes about itself regenerate its behavior elsewhere? Ten models from nine labs write self-descriptions; we place each one in the prompt of other models (receivers) and of fresh instances of the author, and measure how closely their choices on a 110-item preference battery match the author's. First, the tested native self-descriptions (native: the profile measured under a generic assistant prompt) show no average reconstruction gain across variations in length, framing, wording and prompt placement: on a 0 to 1 fidelity scale where a model's fidelity to a fresh instance of itself is 0.979 and to unrelated models about 0.89, the one-sided 95% upper bound on the pooled gain is below +0.01 in every tested system-prompt condition, and descriptions based on the author's observed choices do no better. Second, the channel itself is strong: explicitly listing the author's answers lets receivers reproduce its profile at fidelity 0.955 to 0.960 across three model grids, within 0.03 of same-model repeatability. Third, self-descriptions written under an explicit preference policy transfer the assigned preferences almost as well as the policy text itself. Fourth, reading its own self-description shifts even the author away from its baseline, modestly more than unrelated prose of the same length. For the preferences measured here, native self-descriptions influence behavior without reliably specifying how to reproduce it in another model. We release the pipeline, battery, raw call logs, and 198 model-written descriptions.
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