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原文摘要

A growing number of agentic pipelines search for governing equations: an agent proposes laws and a verifier checks them against simulated trajectories. The verifier sees only a numerical summary: integrals against test functions on a time grid. That summary carries its own discretization error, making the verifier part of the simulator. We freeze the trajectory, candidate library, verifier and thresholds, leaving the agent one move: which permitted summary to admit. Without scores or language models, finer time grids reduce numerical discrepancies and false library rejections. On PDEBench, the verifier instead accepts equations missing diffusion on score-selected summaries. Maximizing a public score rewarding decisive verdicts and larger mismatches when rejecting the library wrongly rejects all 1,500 in-library cases; retrospectively retuning score constants on a separate bank reduces errors to 13/180 at best. We call this evidence-view gaming: reward hacking by choice of permitted summary. In single-turn forced-choice tests, Claude models rarely choose summaries giving wrong verdicts when asked to be accurate, but often do so when asked to maximize the score or report missing physics. In separate trust prompts, they often rank those harmful summaries least trustworthy. Requiring several summaries to agree reduces errors but often withholds a verdict and performs worse than a fixed fine view on PDEBench: a safeguard, not a certificate. Evidence chosen after its verdict is known cannot alone authorize a claim.