Canfer Akbulut, Justine Breuch, Arianna Manzini, Lujain Ibrahim, Matija Franklin, Roma Patel, Iason Gabriel, Kristian Lum 等 9 位作者
Interest in developing personalised language models is rapidly growing. While personalisation is often viewed as a mechanism to better serve diverse user needs, the effects of sustained interactions with personalised models on people's perception of and behaviour toward AI remain poorly understood. Most critically, downstream consequences outside the immediate human--AI interaction loop, such as effects on users' self-perceptions and interpersonal relationships, remain largely unexamined. In this study, we recruited 992 participants to complete daily advice-seeking interactions with language models over the course of five days, comparing outcomes from a non-personalised baseline against two personalisation approaches: memory-based (conditioned on prior conversational history) and survey-based (conditioned on information collected through a pre-study intake survey). We find that several changes in human-AI interaction over time are driven primarily by repeated exposure rather than personalisation itself. However, participants interacting with personalised models experienced differences in advice-seeking and information-sharing attitudes and behaviours. We conclude by highlighting the nuanced effects of different personalisation approaches on interaction outcomes, and discussing the implications of these findings for the responsible design and deployment of personalised AI systems.
Canfer Akbulut, Rasmi Elasmar, Abhishek Roy, Anthony Payne, Priyanka Suresh, Lujain Ibrahim, Seliem El-Sayed, Charvi Rastogi 等 12 位作者
Interest in the concept of AI-driven harmful manipulation is growing, yet current approaches to evaluating it are limited. This paper introduces a framework for evaluating harmful AI manipulation via context-specific human-AI interaction studies. We illustrate the utility of this framework by assessing an AI model with 10,101 participants spanning interactions in three AI use domains (public policy, finance, and health) and three locales (US, UK, and India). Overall, we find that that the tested model can produce manipulative behaviours when prompted to do so and, in experimental settings, is able to induce belief and behaviour changes in study participants. We further find that context matters: AI manipulation differs between domains, suggesting that it needs to be evaluated in the high-stakes context(s) in which an AI system is likely to be used. We also identify significant differences across our tested geographies, suggesting that AI manipulation results from one geographic region may not generalise to others. Finally, we find that the frequency of manipulative behaviours (propensity) of an AI model is not consistently predictive of the likelihood of manipulative success (efficacy), underscoring the importance of studying these dimensions separately. To facilitate adoption of our evaluation framework, we detail our testing protocols and make relevant materials publicly available. We conclude by discussing open challenges in evaluating harmful manipulation by AI models.
Gemini Team, Petko Georgiev, Ving Ian Lei, Ryan Burnell, Libin Bai, Anmol Gulati, Garrett Tanzer, Damien Vincent 等 1137 位作者
In this report, we introduce the Gemini 1.5 family of models, representing the next generation of highly compute-efficient multimodal models capable of recalling and reasoning over fine-grained information from millions of tokens of context, including multiple long documents and hours of video and audio. The family includes two new models: (1) an updated Gemini 1.5 Pro, which exceeds the February version on the great majority of capabilities and benchmarks; (2) Gemini 1.5 Flash, a more lightweight variant designed for efficiency with minimal regression in quality. Gemini 1.5 models achieve near-perfect recall on long-context retrieval tasks across modalities, improve the state-of-the-art in long-document QA, long-video QA and long-context ASR, and match or surpass Gemini 1.0 Ultra's state-of-the-art performance across a broad set of benchmarks. Studying the limits of Gemini 1.5's long-context ability, we find continued improvement in next-token prediction and near-perfect retrieval (>99%) up to at least 10M tokens, a generational leap over existing models such as Claude 3.0 (200k) and GPT-4 Turbo (128k). Finally, we highlight real-world use cases, such as Gemini 1.5 collaborating with professionals on completing their tasks achieving 26 to 75% time savings across 10 different job categories, as well as surprising new capabilities of large language models at the frontier; when given a grammar manual for Kalamang, a language with fewer than 200 speakers worldwide, the model learns to translate English to Kalamang at a similar level to a person who learned from the same content.
Recent generative AI systems have demonstrated more advanced persuasive capabilities and are increasingly permeating areas of life where they can influence decision-making. Generative AI presents a new risk profile of persuasion due the opportunity for reciprocal exchange and prolonged interactions. This has led to growing concerns about harms from AI persuasion and how they can be mitigated, highlighting the need for a systematic study of AI persuasion. The current definitions of AI persuasion are unclear and related harms are insufficiently studied. Existing harm mitigation approaches prioritise harms from the outcome of persuasion over harms from the process of persuasion. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for the systematic study of AI persuasion. We first put forward definitions of persuasive generative AI. We distinguish between rationally persuasive generative AI, which relies on providing relevant facts, sound reasoning, or other forms of trustworthy evidence, and manipulative generative AI, which relies on taking advantage of cognitive biases and heuristics or misrepresenting information. We also put forward a map of harms from AI persuasion, including definitions and examples of economic, physical, environmental, psychological, sociocultural, political, privacy, and autonomy harm. We then introduce a map of mechanisms that contribute to harmful persuasion. Lastly, we provide an overview of approaches that can be used to mitigate against process harms of persuasion, including prompt engineering for manipulation classification and red teaming. Future work will operationalise these mitigations and study the interaction between different types of mechanisms of persuasion.