Sumeet Ramesh Motwani, Tejas Krishnan, Alistair Letcher, Charles London, Suhaas Bhat, Huitian Jiao, Philip Torr, Riashat Islam 等 13 位作者
Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has led to significant gains in math and code generation. Extending these gains to open-ended domains remains challenging: ground-truth verification is unavailable, human annotation is expensive, and learned reward models are prone to reward hacking. The generation-verification gap, where judging good outputs is easier than producing them, offers a potential path to improvement. However, rubric-based judges are often imprecise and stationary, so policies can overfit or reward hack them. We introduce Rubric Curriculum RL (RcRL), which exploits this gap without new data, human annotations, or stronger teacher models. We combine pairwise preferences over rollouts with a curriculum over rubric criteria, yielding a more discriminative signal than absolute scoring and a non-stationary objective. Whereas baselines plateau within a few hundred steps, RcRL preserves output entropy and keeps improving past 1000 steps. On creative writing, RcRL achieves a 70.5% human win rate against the base model, with gains across benchmarks and judges. On HealthBench, RcRL improves over the base model by 14.6% (full set) and 25.4% (consensus subset), outperforming all training baselines, including instance-specific rubrics.
Chandler Smith, Qi Guo, Cecilia Elena Tilli, Sophia Hatz, David Demitri Africa, Patricia Paskov, Christian Schroeder de Witt, Philip Torr 等 9 位作者
The deployment of AI agents in multi-agent settings enables inter-agent influence, whereby agents can strategically steer each other's behaviour towards an intended outcome. Such capabilities pose novel risks, as malicious agents could direct others towards harmful actions. In this work we investigate three such capabilities - persuasion, deception, and coercion - across five realistic evaluation environments and a variety of agents instantiated with frontier language models. We observed significant inter-agent influence capabilities; in oversight environments, all tested models shifted overseer decisions from rejection to approval through persuasion, deception, or coercion. We also observed successful influence in non-hierarchical 'peer-to-peer' settings through redirection of a peer's safety research trajectory. As multi-agent deployments become increasingly commonplace, these results point to a pressing need for work on mitigating the risks from inter-agent influence. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Cooperative-AI-Foundation/inter-agent-influence.