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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.08173

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism

Johannes Brüstle, Simone Di Gregorio, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi

原文摘要

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker in a regret minimization framework. At each time step, a new seller and buyer arrive and the broker proposes a trading price to each agent. The trade happens if both agents accept, and the profit of the broker is the difference between the price received from the buyer and the one paid to the seller. At the end of each interaction, the learner only observes whether the trade occurred, and its goal is to achieve sublinear regret relative to the best fixed pair of prices in hindsight. We start by investigating the adversarial version of the problem, where buyer and seller valuations are generated by an adversary. In this setting, we construct a polynomial-time learning algorithm with a $\tilde O(T^{\frac 23})$ regret rate, which is nearly tight even if the valuations are drawn i.i.d. from independent distributions, thus matching the rate for one-sided pricing. Our adversarial algorithm combines a localized estimation procedure with an information-based minimax construction. We then consider valuations drawn i.i.d. from independent distributions satisfying the monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) property and provide a learning algorithm with nearly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret. The algorithm combines localized estimation with a stochastic convex bandit routine applied to the negative logarithm of expected profit. Finally, we complement this result by showing a separation between MHR and regular distributions, proving that the minimax regret rate in the latter setting is $\tilde Θ(T^{\frac 35})$. This last result contrasts with the $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound that can be obtained for one-sided pricing with regular distributions.

cs.GT · cs.DS · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06223

Consistent Submodular Maximization with Full Foresight

Eric Balkanski, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Silvio Lattanzi, Ashkan Norouzi-Fard, Ola Svensson, Morteza Zadimoghaddam

原文摘要

Online algorithms with bounded recourse face three intertwined obstacles: uncertainty about the future, computational limits, and a limited budget for changes. We ask a fundamental question that separates consistency from the other two: what does solution stability cost when the entire future is known and computation is unlimited? We answer this question for monotone submodular maximization, where an algorithm must maintain a solution of at most $k$ arrived elements, with a constant number of changes per step. We determine the optimal approximation thresholds: $3/4$ for deterministic algorithms and $ξ^\star \approx 0.7942$ for randomized algorithms. For every $\varepsilon>0$, we get within $\varepsilon$ of these thresholds with worst-case recourse polynomial in $1/\varepsilon$, independent of $k$ and the stream length. We prove matching impossibility results even for coverage functions. We attain the sharp bounds by optimally balancing two opposing forces: preparing for future arrivals and protecting the current solution. For randomized algorithms, we use addition robustness against prefixes of the known future, which we analyze tightly via an interval-selection problem. For deterministic algorithms, we introduce certificates, paths in a fractional relaxation that maintain high value, which we round into an update schedule.

cs.DS · cs.LG

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.03851

The Price of Partial Information with Switching Costs: A Complete Characterization for Feedback Graphs

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Emmanuel Esposito, Federico Fusco, Tomer Koren

原文摘要

We study how switching costs affect minimax regret under partial feedback. Which features of the feedback preserve the $\sqrt T$ rate, and which force the $T^{2/3}$ rate? We address this question in the framework of feedback graphs, which interpolate between full information and bandits: playing an action reveals the losses of its out-neighbors in a known directed graph. Prior work on feedback graphs with switching costs gave algorithms with regret of order $T^{2/3}$, but matching lower bounds only for restricted classes of graphs, leaving the question open. We establish a complete characterization of the minimax regret with switching costs for all feedback graphs: $\widetildeΘ(\sqrt T)$ if the graph is strongly revealing, meaning that every pair of distinct actions has an endpoint that observes the losses of both; $\widetildeΘ(γ^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ for every other observable graph, where $γ$ is the domination number; and linear otherwise. In particular, tournaments, in which every action observes its own loss and each pair of actions is joined by one directed edge, sit at the phase transition: they behave like full information, but deleting the edge of any pair forces the rate $T^{2/3}$. Hence an action that observes all losses is neither necessary nor sufficient for the rate $\sqrt T$. Our algorithm TournamentSteering for the strongly revealing case rests on a new principle: each observed comparison of two actions serves both to estimate losses and to steer play, and the loss reduction from steering pays for the variance of the estimates. For every strongly revealing graph, distributing the comparisons among observing actions keeps this variance, and hence the regret, polylogarithmic in the number of actions, by an argument similar to the greedy construction of logarithmic dominating sets in tournaments.

cs.LG