AI agents are playing an increasingly important role in physics research. However, existing physics benchmarks only evaluate fixed questions, isolated sub-tasks, or paper reproduction with given solutions, and rarely check research quality alongside correctness. We introduce FrontierPhysics, an end-to-end benchmark with 56 tasks made by 42 physicists based on their own research, covering nine domains across theoretical, computational, and experimental physics. Each task requires agents to review the literature, develop a research plan, conduct research and experiments, and produce structured outputs and scientific manuscripts. Combining deterministic verifiers with expert-authored rubrics, FrontierPhysics evaluates whether agents' research is correct and publishable. Across 22 models in 26 configurations, no configuration passes more than 46 of its 168 rollouts. Manual review of agent trajectories shows that frontier agents' main weaknesses are insufficiently rigorous reasoning and limited expert intuition, rather than gaps in physics knowledge or execution errors.
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with a strictly concave function coincide. We show that for any number of agents, this rule is the only rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good, strategyproofness, neutrality, minimal completeness, and invariance under disapproving unassigned goods (IDU). Moreover, we present an alternative characterization for two agents, where we replace IDU with non-redundancy and resource-monotonicity. In both characterizations, all axioms are necessary.
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the agents, but can query the agents to make cuts and appraise slices in order to learn. For each entitlement profile, we provide a lower bound on the number of queries that the mediator requires to construct an allocation that respects the entitlements regardless of preferences. If one of the entitlements is irrational, then the mediator requires an arbitrarily large number of queries.