版本更新 · v2arXiv:2508.09004
Dividing a cake for the irrationally entitled
Florian Brandl, Andrew Mackenzie
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the agents, but can query the agents to make cuts and appraise slices in order to learn. For each entitlement profile, we provide a lower bound on the number of queries that the mediator requires to construct an allocation that respects the entitlements regardless of preferences. If one of the entitlements is irrational, then the mediator requires an arbitrarily large number of queries.
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econ.TH · cs.GT