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版本更新 · v6arXiv:2510.15476

SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses

Hanbin Hong, Shuang Wu, Shuya Feng, Nima Naderloui, Shenao Yan, Jingyu Zhang, Ali Arastehfard, Heqing Huang 等 9 位作者

Prompt-security claims for large language models (LLMs) are often compared as properties of individual attacks or defenses, although measured harmfulness depends on the target model, access setting, attack and defense configuration, prompt sample, and judger. We systematize 272 studies through three linked, multi-label taxonomies of jailbreak attacks, defenses, and model vulnerabilities. To make these dependencies explicit, we introduce an access-compatible evaluation protocol over configured $\langle M,A,D,S,J\rangle$ tuples and instantiate it in PromptSecurity, an open-source platform that records method settings, outputs, judgments, and query costs. We release two complementary datasets: JailbreakDB, with 445,752 jailbreak system-user prompt pairs and 1,094,122 benign prompts, and PromptSecurity-Eval, with 166,200 harmful-query and 25,800 benign-utility output records. We evaluate 11 target models, 20 attacks, nine defenses, and three automated judgers under a matched, single-turn protocol using 100 harmful queries and separate benign-utility tasks. Lower attack success can reflect failure to execute transformed requests rather than stronger safety; attack-category advantages can reverse when one method is excluded, and attack success varies with assistant choice. Defenses can reduce harmful outputs while degrading benign-task utility or causing backfire. Rejudging identical outputs also shows that measured attack success is sensitive to the behavior supplied to the judger, highlighting the need to report judger configurations alongside ASR. These findings motivate configuration-aware reporting rather than context-free method rankings. Resources: https://datasec-lab.github.io/PromptSecurityLeaderboard/ https://huggingface.co/datasets/youbin2014/JailbreakDB https://huggingface.co/datasets/youbin2014/PromptSecurity-Eval https://github.com/datasec-lab/PromptSecurity

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cs.CR · cs.AI
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