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原文摘要

Fake Base Station (FBS) detection has been a critical focus of cellular security research for over two decades. However, significant financial and regulatory barriers to accessing commercial FBS (C-FBS) devices have limited direct visibility into real-world operations, forcing detection systems to be designed and evaluated around self-built prototypes. In this paper, we present Devilray, a reconfigurable adversarial baseline to guide effective FBS detection by exploring the realistic adversarial space and identifying blind spots in detection systems -- regions of realistic adversarial behavior excluded by prevailing threat models. To this end, we establish an empirical anchor through the first academic analysis of a C-FBS, define a fundamental four-phase pipeline and seven operational feature dimensions for adversarial behaviors, and extend them with operational variants derived from 3GPP standards analysis. Through combinatorial configurations of operations from commercial practices and specifications, Devilray enables the exploration of 2,592 FBS instances, spanning diverse operational possibilities. Using Devilray, we evaluate seven currently accessible FBS detectors and uncover coverage gaps across all seven, revealing blind spots rooted in assumption-bound design and evaluation. Our work provides an empirically grounded adversarial baseline for evaluating FBS detectors and guiding future detection design, with Devilray and its configuration profiles released to vetted research groups.