Multivariate long-term time series forecasting (MLTSF) models are increasingly deployed in critical domains such as climate, finance, and transportation. Despite their growing importance, the security of MLTSF models against backdoor attacks remains entirely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose BadTime, the first effective backdoor attack tailored for MLTSF. BadTime can manipulate hundreds of future predictions toward a target pattern by injecting a subtle trigger. BadTime addresses two key challenges that become particularly severe in MLTSF: (i) the rapid dilution of local triggers over long horizons, and (ii) the extreme sparsity of backdoor signals under stealth constraints. To counter dilution, BadTime leverages inter-variable correlations, temporal lags, and data-driven initialization to design a distributed, lag-aware trigger whose influence persists over long-range forecasts. To overcome sparsity, it mixes label-similar and label-dissimilar poisoned samples and adopts a decoupled backdoor training objective that explicitly up-weights the sparse backdoor signal, enabling reliable learning at a poisoning rate as low as 1%. Extensive experiments show that BadTime significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art backdoor attack on time series forecasting by extending the attackable horizon from at most 12 timesteps to 720 timesteps (a 60x improvement) and reducing the MAE on target variables by 57% on average, while changing the average clean forecasting error by less than 1%.
As large language models advance rapidly, they are increasingly used to answer medical questions, and many such models are now deployed locally. Once a model is deployed, its behavior is governed mainly by the ethical policy written into its constitution. However, most existing work focuses on factual correctness rather than the trade-off between competing ethical values. Even benchmarks that do evaluate ethics treat it as a fixed property of the model rather than as a variable, so how a constitution reshapes medical-ethics behavior remains largely unexplored. We introduce MedConstBench, a medical-ethics benchmark that treats the deployment constitution as a controlled variable, is organized around Beauchamp's four principles, and is scored by human-calibrated multi-model peer review. It includes MedDilemma, our own dataset of clinical dilemmas, and supports a systematic analysis of how constitutions steer LLMs. Evaluating ten open-source LLMs under four constitutions, we find that the effect of a constitution is dimension-selective and model-dependent, and that no constitution is universally optimal. Motivated by these findings, we propose a do-no-harm adaptive selector that chooses a constitution per model, matching the per-model oracle while guaranteeing a worst-case floor and generalizing to unseen models at low cost.