Game-Theoretic Solvers with Bayesian Opponent Modeling and Moral Rhetoric Framing for GLEE
Hayden Arnold
We describe the agent we submitted to the GLEE Competition, which plays bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion games against a shared pool of human and AI opponents. The agent is built around three central components: a classical game-theoretic solver to compute numeric moves, an online Bayesian layer to estimate opponent archetypes, and a language model to write accompanying messages. We utilize Rubinstein bargaining for bargaining, Faratin concession for negotiation, and Kamenica--Gentzkow disclosure for persuasion, and adapt those models to live opponents using two separate layers: a Bayesian estimate of the opponent's hidden discount factor, reservation value, or signaling reliability, and a Thompson sampling bandit over five moral-foundation framings coupled with an evidence-intuition spectrum to establish message register. Most of the development effort went into the recurring problem that theoretically optimal policies perform poorly in certain live settings; we report associated failure modes, guardrails we built, and our hypotheses. We additionally evaluate our model over 13,200 Monte Carlo games against 11 synthetic opponent archetypes, an ablation of the opponent-modeling layer, and an extensive analysis of 9,337 live-game messages in which moral rhetoric framing in the persuasion setting is strongly correlated with whether the buyer purchased ($χ^2=616.7$, $p \approx 3.7\times10^{-132}$), surviving controls for quality, round, and configuration.
尚无 AI 解读，展示原文摘要