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原文摘要

Access-control policies are written in natural language but enforced as formal models, and translating them into NIST Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) graphs remains unsolved: prior systems cover only subsets of the NGAC model, and none verify the graphs they extract. We present Text2NGAC, a pipeline of cooperating large language models that disambiguates each sentence before extraction, escalates uncertain sentences to a multi-model ensemble, and checks the resulting graph with a five-strategy verifier whose own effectiveness is measured by controlled mutation testing. To our knowledge it is the first system to extract all four NGAC relationship types - associations, prohibitions, event-response obligations, and assignments - from real-world policy documents. Three results anchor the evaluation. The verifier detects 99.7% of 918 injected mutants and every structural fail-open fault, and the fault classes it misses are characterized and weighted by security consequence rather than left unexamined. The extracted graphs are enforceable: one corpus's graph loads unmodified into the NIST reference implementation, which reproduces all 55 access decisions the graph entails and fires an extracted obligation end-to-end. Extraction reaches 97.3-99.6% exact-tuple-match accuracy on the 714 scored sentences of four real corpora, far above three reproduced baselines on matched metrics, and paraphrase probes with semantic re-scoring bound the pipeline's sensitivity to rewording. Reported accuracy is wording- and benchmark-specific, adversarial input is outside the verifier's guarantees, and the intended deployment is extraction plus structural verification feeding expert review. A complete two-tier reproducibility artifact accompanies the paper.