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arXiv 最近完成扫描:等待完成 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-02 00:39各信源进度 →

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.40591

最大基数匹配的 n^{2+o(1)} 时间算法

Maximum Cardinality Matching in $n^{2+o(1)}$ Time

George Z. Li, Jason Li, Junkai Zhang

AI 速览:作者提出一个在一般图上以 n^{2+o(1)} 时间求解最大基数匹配的算法,思路是扩展近期组合最大流技术到斜对称流问题。

We consider the maximum cardinality matching problem in general graphs, and give an $n^{2+o(1)}$-time algorithm for the problem. Our work builds on recent work on combinatorial algorithms for maximum flow and extends the techniques to skew-symmetric flow problems which capture general matchings as a special case.

cs.DS
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.38356

Encode Once, Answer Many: Internalizing Context via Parametric Flow

Xinhao Zhong, Mengxuan Wu, Chonghua Liao, Linxi Xie, Ruicheng Feng, Yanpei Guo, Hao Tan, Jiaxin Hong 等 25 位作者

Large language models are typically adapted to a task either by placing knowledge in the input context, which keeps it external and re-encodes it on every call, or by fine-tuning, which internalizes it but demands a costly round of optimization per task. We aim to internalize the knowledge carried by a context directly into model parameters, without per-task optimization and without keeping the context in the input at inference time. To this end, we propose CLIK, a context-conditioned parameter generator that maps a given context to LoRA parameters for internalizing knowledge in a single forward pass through a Transformer encoder with cross-attention, requiring no test-time gradient updates. Once the generated LoRA is inserted into a frozen base model, the model answers downstream queries from the query alone, having internalized the context into its weights rather than re-reading it. Because the adapter depends only on the context, it is generated once and reused for every query on the same document, so the cost of reading that document is amortized across queries. On document question answering, CLIK substantially improves over the no-context base model and outperforms existing hypernetwork-based generators, while remaining behind a base model that reads the context directly, and it carries over to multi-turn dialogue without any multi-turn-specific training. Analysis further shows that the context-dependent part of the generated adapter concentrates in a compact and specific substructure.

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cs.AI
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.36295

Detecting and Mitigating Query-Based System Prompt Leakage Attacks

Tushar Nayan, Pratik Poudel, Qian Lou, Yuede Ji, Jason Liu, Ruimin Sun

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on proprietary system prompts to enforce task directives, safety policies, and access controls. These prompts are vulnerable to query-based leakage attacks, where black-box adversaries extract confidential instructions through adaptive, multi-turn interactions. Existing defenses often assess queries independently, missing malicious behavior that emerges across interactions. We present AdvGuard, a model-agnostic framework for detecting and mitigating system prompt leakage. AdvGuard models cross-query relationships using a bounded semantic interaction graph, statistically filters candidate components, and converts them into line graphs for graph convolutional network (GCN) classification. This approach captures multi-hop patterns in query similarity that distinguish coordinated extraction from benign workflows. A lightweight prompt-level detector provides protection before sufficient interaction history accumulates, and the framework supports black-box LLM deployments. In mixed-query evaluations, AdvGuard improves recall by up to 36% over the strongest baseline while maintaining a false positive rate of at most 3.4%. In multi-turn workloads, it achieves 97.23%-99.1% F1 with 100% recall. Leave-one-attack-family-out tests yield 99.98% mean recall and 99.99% mean F1, with no observed false positives. Integrated into the adaptive PLeak and LeakAgent attack loops, AdvGuard limits exact-match leakage to 0.00-0.01 and substring-match leakage to 0.01-0.09 across evaluated victim models. These results demonstrate robust detection of unseen attack families and substantially reduced prompt reconstruction.

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cs.CR · cs.AI
arXiv ↗PDF ↗