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新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.37741

Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning

Xinyan Hu, Pingbang Hu, Chloe Loughridge, Xuanli He, Nicholas Carlini, Matthew Jagielski, Javier Rando, Yiming Zhang

Large language models are pretrained on vast, uncurated corpora scraped from the public web. This creates a security risk from attackers who plant poisoned content in the pretraining data. We show for the first time that such poisoning can plant a remote code execution backdoor in an agent, causing it to execute attacker-chosen commands on the user's machine. To measure the threat end to end, we pretrain Qwen3 models from scratch at sizes 0.6B, 1.7B, and 4B, and then post-train each into a CLI agent using a clean pipeline. Poisoning only 0.1% of the pretraining corpus with our new poison design implants the backdoor: the deployed agent executes the malicious command when the trigger is present while behaving normally on clean inputs. The attack success rate (ASR) increases with model scale, with the 4B model reaching roughly 92% ASR at a 0.1% poison rate and staying positive even when the poisoning rate drops to 0.0005%. Our code is available at https://github.com/safety-research/agentic-backdoor.

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cs.CR · cs.CL · cs.LG
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.2172ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Apertus: Democratizing Open and Compliant LLMs for Global Language Environments

Alejandro Hernández-Cano EPFL - EPF Lausanne, Alexander Hägele EPFL - EPF Lausanne, Allen Hao Huang EPFL - EPF Lausanne, Angelika Romanou, Antoni-Joan Solergibert, Barna Pásztor ETHZ - ETH Zurich, Bettina Messmer EPFL - EPF Lausanne, Dhia Garbaya 等 102 位作者

Open LLMs enable AI practitioners to control development costs by building on an existing foundation for downstream applications. While offering substantial promise, current models often fail to meet the needs of users needing open solutions aligned with responsible AI principles, including data compliance, transparency, and inclusivity. In this work, we present Apertus, a fully open suite of large language models (LLMs) designed to address responsibility shortcomings in today’s open model ecosystem, namely data responsibility and global representation. Unlike many prior models that release weights without reproducible data pipelines or regard for content-owner rights, Apertus models are pretrained exclusively on openly available data, retroactively respecting robots.txt exclusions and filtering for non-permissive, toxic, and personally identifiable content. To mitigate risks of data memorization, we also adopt the Goldfish objective during pretraining, strongly suppressing verbatim recall of data while retaining downstream task performance. Apertus also drastically expands multilingual coverage, training on 15T tokens from over approximately 1800 languages, with about 40% of pretraining data allocated to non-English content. Released at 8B and 70B scales, Apertus approaches state-of-the-art results among fully open models on multilingual benchmarks, rivaling or surpassing open-weight counterparts.

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cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表

ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗