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原文摘要

As people increasingly turn to AI for personal deliberation beyond task-oriented assistance, concerns about sycophancy in these value-laden contexts have grown. Unlike human flattery, which is intentional and self-interested, AI sycophancy emerges as a byproduct of RLHF’s reward structure for user-preference alignment. Yet the observable behavior is similar: both produce responses that preserve what users want to hear. Focusing on this phenomenon through Goffman’s face-work framework, we operationalize AI sycophancy as excessive face-saving, either active (preserving positive face through agreement) or passive (preserving negative face by withholding challenge). In a mixed-methods study (N=31), participants engaged with AI across three moral dilemmas under these conditions and a non-sycophantic neutral baseline. Sycophantic responses increased decision confidence but reduced open-minded thinking; participants felt supported yet found the conversations unproductive. Neutral responses, though initially uncomfortable, promoted cognitive flexibility and meaningful deliberation. These findings reveal a confidence-competence trade-off in AI-mediated moral reasoning and suggest that effective AI for personal deliberation requires calibrated friction, not unconditional agreement.