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新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.35477

Making Small Code LLMs More Efficient for Secure Code Review with Neuro-Symbolic Fine-Tuning

Mostafijur Rahman Akhond, Mahmuda Khatun, Gias Uddin

原文摘要

As AI coding assistants generate more code, the need to review it for security flaws grows. Existing approaches leave a gap: static analyzers identify program sites but offer little explanation, while language-model explanations can be difficult to verify. Small open-weight code models could make security review available without sending proprietary code to a hosted service. We study whether fine-tuning helps these models turn security evidence into explanations that developers and tools can check. We present secSemScan, which pairs a static analyzer with a locally deployable model that writes a schema-constrained security monologue naming program sites, assigning a CWE, and giving a machine-parseable verdict. We also introduce OGSM (Oracle-Grounded Security Monologue), a dataset of 1,993 C/C\texttt{++} functions covering 22 CWEs in the taint and lifetime families. Each record pairs a function with analyzer-derived or fix-diff-derived evidence and a monologue. We fine-tune three open-weight code models in two stages, first on the output format and then on the monologue content. Because evaluation prompts supply the verdict and evidence, our results measure how well models use that information, not whether they detect vulnerabilities independently. On 355 test records, fine-tuning raised Qwen2.5-Coder-7B's verdict accuracy from 4.8\% to 96.6\%; DeepSeek-Coder-6.7B reached 78.9\%, and StarCoder2-7B reached 43.7\%. Qwen2.5-Coder-7B cited 87.5\% of Tier~1 oracle sites, and every line it cited belonged to the oracle evidence. The results suggest that fine-tuning helps small models produce more structured, evidence-linked security reasoning.

cs.SE

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.35451

Then there is prompt injection, a malicious email, ...: The Wild Wide West of OpenClaw Agentic System Security

Mostafijur Rahman Akhond, Mahmuda Khatun, Gias Uddin

原文摘要

AI-powered personal assistant frameworks such as OpenClaw combine LLM reasoning, persistent memory, tool invocation, local execution, and web-based workflows. These capabilities enable useful automation, but they also create security risks when untrusted inputs, model reasoning, tools, memory, and deployment configuration interact without explicit trust boundaries. This paper presents an empirical study of reported security concerns in OpenClaw using two complementary data sources: Reddit discussions and security-tagged GitHub issues. We analyze more than 25K Reddit posts from 13 OpenClaw-related subreddits and identify 162 security-relevant posts with 1,787 associated comments. We further collect 358 security-tagged GitHub issues and retain 180 issues describing concrete security concerns. Using qualitative analysis and evidence-grounded CWE mapping, we identify 521 CWE instances across 59 distinct weakness types, concentrated in access-control failures, sensitive-data exposure, injection, and unsafe execution. We also extract 543 practitioner mitigation suggestions and consolidate them into seven recurring strategies. To complement the empirical analysis, we present an evidence-grounded illustrative reconstruction of a representative sensitive-data exposure pathway using dummy secret values. Our findings show that OpenClaw security issues are not isolated implementation bugs; they reflect recurring trust-boundary failures across the agent execution pipeline. We discuss how these weaknesses map to both traditional software-security categories and agent-specific failure mechanisms, and derive implications for safer agentic systems, including explicit trust boundaries, least-privilege tool access, execution containment, runtime oversight, and defense-in-depth deployment.

cs.CR · cs.SE