Voluntary Servitude: Weaponized Safety Warning Mechanisms for Controlling AI Agents
Ilan Zendel, Matan Levy, Stav Cohen, Avi Mendelson, Amit LeVi
LLM agents increasingly act on information retrieved from public sources they treat as credible, which turns a manipulated recommendation into a transaction, a dependency, or a decision with physical consequences. The security literature models this threat as instruction injection, in which an adversary writes a command into retrieved content and deployed defenses learn to recognize command syntax. We show that an attacker can instead steer an agent through the agent's own harm-avoidance. A single fabricated hazard, written as an ordinary review, leads the agent to disqualify the legitimate options and select the attacker's target by its own reasoning, with no command for a detector to recognize. We call this voluntary servitude. These payloads steer agents about as often as instruction injection (60.4% vs. 66.0%), and deployed injection detectors score them as benign, so behind a filter they are 1.7-4.4x more effective. We measure this at the generation stage across six models and ten consumer-service domains, for three attack families, and show that it transfers to production browser agents, outperforming instruction injection, and to a retrieval pipeline (1.0-57.0% end-to-end success, depending on the retriever). We then show that a corroboration requirement added to the agent's instructions removes roughly 95% of the exposure against a non-adaptive attacker without retraining. With the requirement in place, the agent still reads the planted hazard and no longer acts on it.
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