Bohan Lin, Kuo Yang, Zelin Tan University of Science and Technology of China, Yingchuan Lai, Chen Zhang, Guibin Zhang National University of Singapore, Xinlei Yu, Miao Yu 等 11 位作者
Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models promise improved problem-solving through collaboration, yet they often fail to consistently outperform strong single-agent baselines due to error propagation at inter-agent message handoffs. In this work, we conduct a systematic empirical analysis of such failures and introduce an edge-level error taxonomy that identifies four dominant error types: Data Gap, Signal Corruption, Referential Drift, and Capability Gap, as primary sources of failure in multi-agent interactions. Building on this taxonomy, we propose AgentAsk, a lightweight clarification module designed to intervene at the edge level in MAS to prevent cascading errors. The module operates by strategically applying minimal clarifications at critical points within the system, improving the accuracy and efficiency of the overall task. AgentAsk is trained to balance the trade-offs between clarification cost, latency, and accuracy, while it is also architecture-agnostic and can be easily integrated into existing systems. Evaluated across five benchmarks, AgentAsk consistently improves accuracy by up to 4.69%, while keeping latency and extra costs below 10% compared to baseline MAS, showcasing its high efficiency and minimal overhead. The code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AgentAsk-3432.
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cs.CL · cs.MA
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表
Liang Lin, Miao Yu, Moayad Aloqaily, Zhenhong Zhou, Kun Wang, Linsey Pang PayPal Inc., Prakhar Mehrotra Walmart Labs, Qingsong Wen
Backdoor attacks are a significant threat to large language models (LLMs), often embedded via public checkpoints, yet existing defenses rely on impractical assumptions about trigger settings. To address this challenge, we propose Locphylax, a defense framework that requires no prior knowledge of trigger settings. Locphylax is based on the key observation that when deliberately injecting known backdoors into an already-compromised model, both existing unknown and newly injected backdoors aggregate in the representation space. Locphylax leverages this through a two-stage process: first, aggregating backdoor representations by injecting known triggers, and then, performing recovery fine-tuning to restore benign outputs. Extensive experiments across multiple LLM architectures demonstrate that: (I) Locphylax reduces the average Attack Success Rate to 4.41% across multiple benchmarks, outperforming existing baselines by 28.1%–69.3%. (II) Clean accuracy and utility are preserved within 0.5% of the original model, ensuring negligible impact on legitimate tasks. (III) The defense generalizes across different types of backdoors, confirming its robustness in practical deployment scenarios. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Locphylax.
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cs.CL
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表