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Zirah is a hardware signer built around an STM32F407 microcontroller, and its purpose is to find out, on inexpensive hardware, where a post-quantum signing key is exposed and what actually protects it. The device draws every random bit from a reverse-biased 2N3904 junction in avalanche breakdown, amplified by an LM358 and screened by SP 800-90B health tests, computes ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, hedged) on the STM32 with two-share arithmetic masking of the secret-key multiplications, and adds ECDSA P-256 from an ATECC608 secure element over the same digest, once a person has matched an eight-digit digest prefix on its OLED with the PC and pressed a button. A desktop application and a command-line tool drive the board and verify its output, and because only a 32-byte manifest digest reaches the device, it signs files of any type and size, returning signed copies for PDF, Office Open XML, ZIP, PNG and JPEG files and detached records for every other format. NIST's SP 800-90B tool rejected the IID assumption for 1,000,000 raw samples and assessed 6.898 bits of min-entropy per byte on the non-IID track, against the 1 bit the firmware credits, while spectral lines near 116 Hz that hold about 5 % of the variance remain unexplained. At 168 MHz the masked signature took a median of 157 ms over 20 runs and a complete signing operation under 0.8 s, and the signer matched the pq-crystals reference in 1,976 checks natively and on an emulated Cortex-M4. The ATECC608 can neither store the 4,032-byte ML-DSA-65 key nor compute with it, so that key sits in ordinary flash behind readout protection, and on an earlier board, before that protection was enabled, a debugger copied it out and the copy produced a valid ML-DSA-65 signature without the device, although the leakage results come from an instruction-level emulator and nothing here is certified.