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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07164

Full Provenance on the COSS Causal Axis: An Event-Level Closure of Causal Attribution and Confused-Deputy Exclusion

Nicola Gallo

原文摘要

Provenance Identity Continuity (PIC) represents an authority-use event as an operation/resource behavior situated in a causal lineage, $(o,r,\ell)\in O\times R\times L$. We make the causal occurrence itself primitive: a represented security-relevant causal graph $(E,\to_c)$ in which each occurrence has a unique causal history, so the consistent event-lineage space is canonically isomorphic to $E$. The modeled execution has one causal partial order; distinct lineages are distinct causal histories inside it and may share a root while diverging into incomparable branches. PIC's $O\times R\times L$ is the authority-behavior projection of this space, and Causally Ordered Security-State (COSS) continuity generalizes it to an arbitrary behavior product over the same causal execution. On this semantics we prove an architecture-independent confused-deputy exclusion theorem. PIC continuation requires $C(e')\subseteq C(e)$ on every ordinary causal edge, so descendants are bounded by their ancestors; at an ordinary join, authority available on only one incoming branch cannot be resurrected, even when branches share a common root. Non-conservative combination must be an explicit authorized composition or relaxation event. With protected-effect mediation, an effect caused by request $q$ through an ordinary authority segment can exercise only authority in $C(q)$, so a confused-deputy state is contradictory. The result holds for any system whose protected request-to-effect causes are faithfully represented and whose ordinary authority transport satisfies PIC. We revisit Rajani, Garg, and Rezk: their value, control-flow, and initial-heap attacks are different witnesses of causal ancestry, so full provenance is an evidence mechanism for recovering edges of the causal graph, not the foundation of the PIC theorem. Finally we lift it to the COSS product of heterogeneous security-state coordinates.

cs.CR · cs.DC

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07159

Beyond Proof of Possession: A Relational Theory of Authority

Nicola Gallo

原文摘要

Proof-of-Possession (PoP) establishes that an executor controls an artifact (key, token, credential, or capability), but such control alone determines neither the executor's relational profile nor the causal history of an execution occurrence. We separate PoP from Proof of Relationship (PoR), the semantic property that one execution occurrence validly continues another, and from authorization, which is occurrence-sensitive. The foundational change is in the semantic domain of authorization: from holders and authority-bearing artifacts to execution occurrences situated in causal histories. We give authorization models an observation-based occurrence verdict and a separate transition-admissibility relation; kernel inclusion yields a partial order on observation-kernel classes. Building on Provenance Identity Continuity (PIC) and Proof-of-Continuity (PoC), we classify executors by authorization-relevant equivalence relations whose quotients form relational profile spaces, with positive predicates over profile transitions forming a distributive lattice. This adds relational attenuation to authority attenuation: along a valid causal history, $C_{i+1}\subseteq C_i$ and $ρ_{i+1}\Rightarrowρ_i$. We prove dual monotonicity, combined closure, and origin relational closure. Two occurrences of the same authenticated executor, with the same profile and possession evidence, need not be authorization-equivalent, and within a valid PIC lineage a deputy's independent authority cannot be imported outside the origin context. Finally, we prove that the executor-dependent decision factors through the relational profile and is invariant under sound mechanisms establishing it: successor-side PoP is a possible evidence mechanism, not a necessary premise of authorization. Under explicit Witness Assumptions, a boundary-witnessed checkpoint construction realizes the premises without successor-side PoP.

cs.CR · cs.DC