Single-or-Sample: Online Fair Allocation for Combinatorial Agents
Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang, Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Parnian Shahkar
We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ heterogeneous agents arriving online, under maximin share (MMS) fairness. The key challenge lies in making allocation decisions in an adversarial setting without knowing future agents' valuations. No guarantees were known prior to our work in adversarial settings. Our main positive result is an online allocation algorithm for submodular agents that with probability at least $0.4$ guarantees a $1/24$-approximation to MMS to all agents simultaneously. Our algorithm intersperses a greedy-style adaptive sampling-without-replacement protocol with single-good reduction rounds. For XOS valuations, we adapt this single-or-sample approach to guarantee a $c$-MMS for all agents simultaneously with probability $1-O(c)$ for any parameter $c\in O(1/\log n)$. A key technical contribution of our work is in establishing Chernoff-style tail bounds on item allocation events for this adaptive sampling process despite strong positive correlations among the items, a result that may be of independent interest. The approximation versus success probability tradeoffs achieved by our algorithms are asymptotically tight. We show that even for binary additive valuations, no randomized algorithm can ensure $c$-MMS to all agents with probability exceeding $(1-c^2/5)$, for any $c\in (0,1]$. For XOS valuations, stronger lower bounds hold: no randomized algorithm can ensure $c$-MMS to all agents with probability exceeding $(1-c/3)$, for any $c\in (0,1]$. Furthermore, no algorithm can achieve $ω(1/\log \log n)$-MMS with any constant probability. All our lower bounds hold even for simple binary instances whose MMS values and MMS partitions can be computed in linear time.
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