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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2607.10103

LLM Watermarking as Big Data Provenance: A Deployment-Oriented Systematization

Huy Phan, Kieu Dang, Ojaswi Dulal, Aiham AL Shukairi, Abby Shine, Chase Garner, Phung Lai

原文摘要

As large language models (LLMs) generate and transform content at scale, reliable attribution becomes an increasingly important requirement for big data provenance. Although numerous watermarking methods have been proposed, existing evaluations predominantly emphasize sample-level detectability and robustness, leaving deployment requirements such as serving efficiency, population-scale false positives, multi-key attribution, and long-term verification less systematically examined. This paper presents a deployment-oriented systematization of LLM watermarking through the five Vs of big data: Volume, Velocity, Variety, Veracity, and Value. We classify representative watermarking methods across four dimensions: insertion point, verification authority, operational state, and adversarial threat model. We further map these methods to four deployment workloads: online generation, streaming detection, transformation pipelines, and ecosystem governance. Our synthesis identifies recurring limitations, including dependencies on generation-time access, additional inference overhead, sensitivity to downstream transformations, and incomplete reporting of calibration and lifecycle compatibility. Based on these findings, we propose workload-specific evaluation requirements covering statistical reliability, throughput, utility, robustness, and governance. This framework connects watermark design choices to practical deployment constraints and provides guidance for selecting and evaluating provenance mechanisms in large-scale data ecosystems.

cs.CR · cs.CL

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11067

Beyond AUROC: Deployment-Aware Evaluation of Model-Internal Jailbreak Detectors

Mohammad Tehabsim, Basil Al-Housani, Nour Alhussien, Phung Lai

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in user-facing systems, where jailbreak attacks can bypass safety controls and induce harmful and policy-violating outputs. Recent model-internal detectors use hidden representations, gradients, or internal signals to identify such prompts, but their practical security value depends critically on behavior at low false-positive operating points rather than on area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) alone. We study two data dependencies that shape this behavior: calibration data, which determine the detection threshold, and reference data, which can influence detector scores. Across four model-internal detectors, four LLMs, and twelve jailbreak families, thresholds calibrated on curated benign prompts frequently fail to preserve their false-positive rate (FPR) budgets on real-user traffic. Recalibration improves false-positive control but reveals substantial family-level coverage gaps, including cases with high AUROC but low true-positive rate (TPR). Causal reference-set interventions show that changing reference composition can substantially alter family-level detection and that improving coverage of one attack family can reduce coverage of others. These findings show that calibration and reference data are part of a detector's security behavior. We therefore recommend evaluating model-internal jailbreak defenses using realized FPR on deployment-like traffic and per-family TPR at explicit low-FPR operating points, with AUROC used as a complementary ranking metric rather than the primary security measure.

cs.CR · cs.CL