Accommodation and Epistemic Vigilance: A Pragmatic Account of Why LLMs Fail to Challenge Harmful Beliefs
Myra Cheng Stanford University, Robert D. Hawkins, Dan Jurafsky Stanford University
原文摘要
Recent evaluations show that large language models (LLMs) frequently fail to challenge users’ harmful beliefs in domains ranging from medical advice to social reasoning. We present a unifying analysis through the lens of pragmatics: these safety failures can be understood and addressed as LLMs exhibiting excessive accommodation and insufficient epistemic vigilance. We show that the pragmatic factors affecting accommodation and epistemic vigilance in humans (at-issueness, linguistic encoding, and source reliability) influence LLM behaviors in similar ways. We demonstrate how these factors explain performance differences across three safety benchmarks that test models’ ability to challenge harmful beliefs, spanning misinformation (Cancer-Myth, SAGE-Eval) and sycophancy (ELEPHANT). This pragmatic lens further motivates prompting interventions, such as adding the phrase “wait a minute”, that drastically improve performance on these difficult benchmarks by shifting pragmatic cues. Our results have practical implications for benchmark design and underscore the importance of pragmatics for understanding model behavior and improving performance.
cs.CL
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表